Gitweb:
https://git.exim.org/exim.git/commitdiff/415c5379af11bf8777af1a082a336ad7c5369525
Commit: 415c5379af11bf8777af1a082a336ad7c5369525
Parent: 6242a0bdfb6bacb2fc52e335ca550b62f2f39020
Author: Jeremy Harris <jgh146exb@???>
AuthorDate: Tue Nov 22 22:32:59 2022 +0000
Committer: Jeremy Harris <jgh146exb@???>
CommitDate: Wed Nov 23 00:06:42 2022 +0000
OpenSSL: OCSP under DANE
---
src/src/tls-openssl.c | 318 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
test/aux-fixed/exim-ca/genall | 5 +-
test/confs/5840 | 13 +-
test/confs/5847 | 150 +++++++++++++
test/log/5601 | 6 +-
test/log/5611 | 6 +-
test/log/5740 | 6 +-
test/log/5847 | 51 +++++
test/scripts/5846-DANE-OpenSSL-OCSP/5847 | 78 +++++++
test/scripts/5846-DANE-OpenSSL-OCSP/REQUIRES | 4 +
test/stderr/5840 | 2 +-
11 files changed, 543 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/src/tls-openssl.c b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
index 2e09882d2..3873bbba3 100644
--- a/src/src/tls-openssl.c
+++ b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ change this guard and punt the issue for a while longer. */
#if !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030000000L)
# define EXIM_HAVE_EXPORT_CHNL_BNGNG
+# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_X509_STORE_GET1_ALL_CERTS
#endif
#if !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) \
@@ -117,6 +118,7 @@ change this guard and punt the issue for a while longer. */
# define OPENSSL_HAVE_NUM_TICKETS
# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CIPHER_STD_NAME
# define EXIM_HAVE_EXP_CHNL_BNGNG
+# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_RESP_GET0_SIGNER
# else
# define OPENSSL_BAD_SRVR_OURCERT
# endif
@@ -408,15 +410,16 @@ typedef struct exim_openssl_state {
uschar * privatekey;
BOOL is_server;
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
- STACK_OF(X509) *verify_stack; /* chain for verifying the proof */
union {
struct {
uschar *file;
const uschar *file_expanded;
ocsp_resplist *olist;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *verify_stack; /* chain for verifying the proof */
} server;
struct {
X509_STORE *verify_store; /* non-null if status requested */
+ uschar *verify_errstr; /* only if _required */
BOOL verify_required;
} client;
} u_ocsp;
@@ -440,7 +443,7 @@ exim_openssl_state_st state_server = {.is_server = TRUE};
static int
setup_certs(SSL_CTX * sctx, uschar ** certs, uschar * crl, host_item * host,
- uschar ** errstr );
+ uschar ** errstr);
/* Callbacks */
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
@@ -1119,18 +1122,6 @@ if (preverify_ok == 0)
else if (depth != 0)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify ok: depth=%d SN=%s\n", depth, dn);
-#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
- if (tlsp == &tls_out && client_static_state->u_ocsp.client.verify_store)
- { /* client, wanting stapling */
- /* Add the server cert's signing chain as the one
- for the verification of the OCSP stapled information. */
-
- if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(client_static_state->u_ocsp.client.verify_store,
- cert))
- ERR_clear_error();
- sk_X509_push(client_static_state->verify_stack, cert);
- }
-#endif
#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
if (verify_event(tlsp, cert, depth, dn, calledp, optionalp, US"SSL"))
return 0; /* reject, with peercert set */
@@ -1258,21 +1249,7 @@ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify_callback_client_dane: %s depth %d %s\n",
#endif
if (preverify_ok == 1)
- {
tls_out.dane_verified = TRUE;
-#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
- if (client_static_state->u_ocsp.client.verify_store)
- { /* client, wanting stapling */
- /* Add the server cert's signing chain as the one
- for the verification of the OCSP stapled information. */
-
- if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(client_static_state->u_ocsp.client.verify_store,
- cert))
- ERR_clear_error();
- sk_X509_push(client_static_state->verify_stack, cert);
- }
-#endif
- }
else
{
int err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x509ctx);
@@ -1288,6 +1265,14 @@ return preverify_ok;
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+static void
+time_print(BIO * bp, const char * str, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME * time)
+{
+BIO_printf(bp, "\t%s: ", str);
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, time);
+BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+}
+
/*************************************************
* Load OCSP information into state *
*************************************************/
@@ -1377,7 +1362,7 @@ if (!(basic_response = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp)))
goto bad;
}
-sk = state->verify_stack; /* set by setup_certs() / chain_from_pem_file() */
+sk = state->u_ocsp.server.verify_stack; /* set by setup_certs() / chain_from_pem_file() */
/* May need to expose ability to adjust those flags?
OCSP_NOSIGS OCSP_NOVERIFY OCSP_NOCHAIN OCSP_NOCHECKS OCSP_NOEXPLICIT
@@ -1398,11 +1383,13 @@ cannot used the connection context store, as that would neatly
handle the "system" case too, but there seems to be no library
function for getting a stack from a store.
[ In OpenSSL 1.1 - ? X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) ? ]
+[ 3.0.0 - sk = X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(store) ]
We do not free the stack since it could be needed a second time for
SNI handling.
Separately we might try to replace using OCSP_basic_verify() - which seems to not
be a public interface into the OpenSSL library (there's no manual entry) -
+(in 3.0.0 + is is public)
But what with? We also use OCSP_basic_verify in the client stapling callback.
And there we NEED it; we must verify that status... unless the
library does it for us anyway? */
@@ -1412,7 +1399,7 @@ if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(basic_response, sk, NULL, OCSP_NOVERIFY)) < 0)
DEBUG(D_tls)
{
ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
- debug_printf("OCSP response verify failure: %s\n", US ssl_errstring);
+ debug_printf("OCSP response has bad signature: %s\n", US ssl_errstring);
}
goto bad;
}
@@ -1446,7 +1433,16 @@ if (status != V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD)
if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP status invalid times.\n");
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ {
+ BIO * bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ uschar * s = NULL;
+ int len;
+ time_print(bp, "This OCSP Update", thisupd);
+ if (nextupd) time_print(bp, "Next OCSP Update", nextupd);
+ if ((len = (int) BIO_get_mem_data(bp, CSS &s)) > 0) debug_printf("%.*s", len, s);
+ debug_printf("OCSP status invalid times.\n");
+ }
goto bad;
}
@@ -1921,7 +1917,7 @@ else
#if defined(EXIM_HAVE_INOTIFY) || defined(EXIM_HAVE_KEVENT)
/* Invalidate the creds cached, by dropping the current ones.
Call when we notice one of the source files has changed. */
-
+
static void
tls_server_creds_invalidate(void)
{
@@ -1955,28 +1951,61 @@ tls_client_creds_invalidate(transport_instance * t)
/* Extreme debug
+ * */
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-void
-x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(X509_STORE * store)
+static void
+debug_print_sn(const X509 * cert)
{
-STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) * roots= store->objs;
+X509_NAME * sn = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
static uschar name[256];
+if (X509_NAME_oneline(sn, CS name, sizeof(name)))
+ {
+ name[sizeof(name)-1] = '\0';
+ debug_printf(" %s\n", name);
+ }
+}
-for (int i= 0; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(roots); i++)
+static void
+x509_stack_dump_cert_s_names(const STACK_OF(X509) * sk)
+{
+if (!sk)
+ debug_printf(" (null)\n");
+else
{
- X509_OBJECT * tmp_obj= sk_X509_OBJECT_value(roots, i);
- if(tmp_obj->type == X509_LU_X509)
+ int idx = sk_X509_num(sk);
+ if (!idx)
+ debug_printf(" (empty)\n");
+ else
+ while (--idx >= 0) debug_print_sn(sk_X509_value(sk, idx));
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(X509_STORE * store)
+{
+# ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_X509_STORE_GET1_ALL_CERTS
+STACK_OF(X509) * sk = X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(store);
+x509_stack_dump_cert_s_names(sk);
+sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+
+# else
+if (!store)
+ debug_printf(" (no store)\n");
+else
+ {
+ STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) * objs = X509_STORE_get0_objects(store);
+ if (!objs)
+ debug_printf(" (null objectlist)\n");
+ else for (int i = 0; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(objs); i++)
{
- X509_NAME * sn = X509_get_subject_name(tmp_obj->data.x509);
- if (X509_NAME_oneline(sn, CS name, sizeof(name)))
- {
- name[sizeof(name)-1] = '\0';
- debug_printf(" %s\n", name);
- }
+ X509 * cert = X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(sk_X509_OBJECT_value(objs, i));
+ if (cert) debug_print_sn(cert);
}
}
+# endif
}
-#endif
+#endif /*!DISABLE_OCSP*/
+/*
*/
@@ -2420,11 +2449,21 @@ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
static void
-time_print(BIO * bp, const char * str, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME * time)
+add_chain_to_store(X509_STORE * store, STACK_OF(X509) * sk,
+ const char * debug_text)
{
-BIO_printf(bp, "\t%s: ", str);
-ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, time);
-BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+int idx;
+
+DEBUG(D_tls)
+ {
+ debug_printf("chain for %s:\n", debug_text);
+ x509_stack_dump_cert_s_names(sk);
+ }
+if (sk)
+ if ((idx = sk_X509_num(sk)) > 0)
+ while (--idx >= 0)
+ X509_STORE_add_cert(store, sk_X509_value(sk, idx));
+
}
static int
@@ -2440,18 +2479,24 @@ int i;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS status callback (OCSP stapling):\n");
len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, &p);
if(!p)
- { /* Expect this when we requested ocsp but got none */
+ { /* Expect this when we requested ocsp but got none */
if (SSL_session_reused(ssl) && tls_out.ocsp == OCSP_VFIED)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" null, but resumed; ocsp vfy stored with session is good\n");
return 1;
}
+
if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required && LOGGING(tls_cipher))
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Required TLS certificate status not received");
else
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" null\n");
- return cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
- }
+
+ if (!cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required)
+ return 1;
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_errstr =
+ US"(SSL_connect) Required TLS certificate status not received";
+ return 0;
+ }
if (!(rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len)))
{
@@ -2483,39 +2528,140 @@ if (!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
*/
{
BIO * bp = NULL;
+ X509_STORE * verify_store = NULL;
+ BOOL have_verified_OCSP_signer = FALSE;
#ifndef EXIM_HAVE_OCSP_RESP_COUNT
STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) * sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
#endif
DEBUG(D_tls) bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- /*OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0); extreme debug: stapling content */
+ /* Use the CA & chain that verified the server cert to verify the stapled info */
+
+ {
+ /* If this routine is not available, we've avoided [in tls_client_start()]
+ asking for certificate-status under DANE, so this callback won't run for
+ that combination. It still will for non-DANE. */
+
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_RESP_GET0_SIGNER
+ X509 * signer;
+
+ if ( tls_out.dane_verified
+ && (have_verified_OCSP_signer =
+ OCSP_resp_get0_signer(bs, &signer, SSL_get0_verified_chain(ssl)) == 1))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("signer for OCSP basicres is in the verified chain;"
+ " shortcut its verification\n");
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ STACK_OF(X509) * verified_chain;
+
+ verify_store = X509_STORE_new();
+
+ SSL_get0_chain_certs(ssl, &verified_chain);
+ add_chain_to_store(verify_store, verified_chain,
+ "'current cert' per SSL_get0_chain_certs()");
+
+ verified_chain = SSL_get0_verified_chain(ssl);
+ add_chain_to_store(verify_store, verified_chain,
+ "SSL_get0_verified_chain()");
+ }
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ {
+ debug_printf("Untrusted intermediate cert stack (from SSL_get_peer_cert_chain()):\n");
+ x509_stack_dump_cert_s_names(SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl));
+
+ debug_printf("will use this CA store for verifying basicresp:\n");
+ x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(verify_store);
+
+ /* OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0); extreme debug: stapling content */
+
+ debug_printf("certs contained in basicresp:\n");
+ x509_stack_dump_cert_s_names((STACK_OF(X509 *))OCSP_resp_get0_certs(bs));
+
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_X509_STORE_GET1_ALL_CERTS /* else, could bodge via X509_STORE_get0_objects()
+ - but is OCSP_resp_get0_signer) avail? from 1.1.1 */
+ {
+ X509 * signer;
+ if (OCSP_resp_get0_signer(bs, &signer, X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(verify_store)) == 1)
+ {
+ debug_printf("found signer for basicres:\n");
+ debug_print_sn(signer);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ debug_printf("failed to find signer for basicres:\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bp);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ }
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ /* Under DANE the trust-anchor (at least in TA mode) is indicated by the TLSA
+ record in DNS, and probably is not the root of the chain of certificates. So
+ accept a partial chain for that case (and hope that anchor is visible for
+ verifying the OCSP stapling).
+ XXX for EE mode it won't even be that. Does that make OCSP useless for EE?
- /* Use the chain that verified the server cert to verify the stapled info */
- /* DEBUG(D_tls) x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store); */
+ Worse, for LetsEncrypt-mode (ocsp signer is leaf-signer) under DANE, the
+ data used within OpenSSL for the signer has nil pointers for signing
+ algorithms - and a crash results. Avoid this by shortcutting verification,
+ having determined that the OCSP signer is in the (DANE-)validated set.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OCSP_PARTIAL_CHAIN /* defined for 3.0.0 onwards */
+# define OCSP_PARTIAL_CHAIN 0
+#endif
- if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, cbinfo->verify_stack,
- cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, OCSP_NOEXPLICIT)) <= 0)
+ if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl),
+ verify_store,
+ tls_out.dane_verified
+ ? have_verified_OCSP_signer
+ ? OCSP_NOVERIFY | OCSP_NOEXPLICIT
+ : OCSP_PARTIAL_CHAIN | OCSP_NOEXPLICIT
+ : OCSP_NOEXPLICIT)) <= 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP_basic_verify() fail: returned %d\n", i);
if (ERR_peek_error())
{
tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
if (LOGGING(tls_cipher))
{
- const uschar * errstr = CUS ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_peek_error());
static uschar peerdn[256];
+ const uschar * errstr;;
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+ ERR_peek_error_all(NULL, NULL, NULL, CCSS &errstr, NULL);
+ if (!errstr)
+#endif
+ errstr = CUS ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_peek_error());
+
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)),
CS peerdn, sizeof(peerdn));
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
"[%s] %s Received TLS cert (DN: '%.*s') status response, "
"itself unverifiable: %s",
- sender_host_address, sender_host_name,
- (int)sizeof(peerdn), peerdn,
- errstr);
+ deliver_host_address, deliver_host,
+ (int)sizeof(peerdn), peerdn, errstr);
}
DEBUG(D_tls)
{
BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response verify failure\n");
ERR_print_errors(bp);
+ {
+ uschar * s = NULL;
+ int len = (int) BIO_get_mem_data(bp, CSS &s);
+ if (len > 0) debug_printf("%.*s", len, s);
+ BIO_reset(bp);
+ }
OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0);
}
goto failed;
@@ -2523,6 +2669,7 @@ if (!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
else
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("no explicit trust for OCSP signing"
" in the root CA certificate; ignoring\n");
+ }
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response well-formed and signed OK\n");
@@ -2565,6 +2712,8 @@ if (!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
{
tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
DEBUG(D_tls) ERR_print_errors(bp);
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_errstr =
+ US"(SSL_connect) Server certificate status is out-of-date";
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "OCSP dates invalid");
goto failed;
}
@@ -2576,12 +2725,16 @@ if (!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
continue; /* the idx loop */
case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_errstr =
+ US"(SSL_connect) Server certificate revoked";
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server certificate revoked%s%s",
reason != -1 ? "; reason: " : "",
reason != -1 ? OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason) : "");
DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "Revocation Time", rev);
break;
default:
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_errstr =
+ US"(SSL_connect) Server certificate has unknown status";
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
"Server certificate status unknown, in OCSP stapling");
break;
@@ -2635,8 +2788,7 @@ tls_init(host_item * host, smtp_transport_options_block * ob,
uschar *ocsp_file,
#endif
address_item *addr, exim_openssl_state_st ** caller_state,
- tls_support * tlsp,
- uschar ** errstr)
+ tls_support * tlsp, uschar ** errstr)
{
SSL_CTX * ctx;
exim_openssl_state_st * state;
@@ -2798,7 +2950,7 @@ else
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
- if (!(state->verify_stack = sk_X509_new_null()))
+ if (!host && !(state->u_ocsp.server.verify_stack = sk_X509_new_null()))
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("failed to create stack for stapling verify\n");
return FAIL;
@@ -2847,11 +2999,12 @@ else /* client */
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("failed to create store for stapling verify\n");
return FAIL;
}
+
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, tls_client_stapling_cb);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, state);
}
# endif
-#endif
+#endif /*EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT*/
state->verify_cert_hostnames = NULL;
@@ -2990,7 +3143,7 @@ if (tlsp->peercert)
*************************************************/
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-/* Load certs from file, return TRUE on success */
+/* In the server, load certs from file, return TRUE on success */
static BOOL
chain_from_pem_file(const uschar * file, STACK_OF(X509) ** vp)
@@ -3020,7 +3173,7 @@ repeated after a Server Name Indication.
Arguments:
sctx SSL_CTX* to initialise
- certs certs file, returned expanded
+ certsp certs file, returned expanded
crl CRL file or NULL
host NULL in a server; the remote host in a client
errstr error string pointer
@@ -3066,19 +3219,20 @@ if (expcerts && *expcerts)
{
STACK_OF(X509) * verify_stack =
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
- !host ? state_server.verify_stack :
+ !host ? state_server.u_ocsp.server.verify_stack :
#endif
NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) ** vp = &verify_stack;
file = expcerts; dir = NULL;
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
- /* In the server if we will be offering an OCSP proof, load chain from
+ /* In the server if we will be offering an OCSP proof; load chain from
file for verifying the OCSP proof at load time. */
/*XXX Glitch! The file here is tls_verify_certs: the chain for verifying the client cert.
This is inconsistent with the need to verify the OCSP proof of the server cert.
*/
+/* *debug_printf("file for checking server ocsp stapling is: %s\n", file); */
if ( !host
&& statbuf.st_size > 0
&& state_server.u_ocsp.server.file
@@ -3304,7 +3458,7 @@ TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
if (state_server.lib_state.pri_string)
{ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cipher list was preloaded\n"); }
-else
+else
{
if (!expand_check(tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers, errstr))
return FAIL;
@@ -3707,7 +3861,6 @@ tls_retrieve_session(tls_support * tlsp, SSL * ssl)
{
if (tlsp->host_resumable)
{
- const uschar * key = tlsp->resume_index;
dbdata_tls_session * dt;
int len;
open_db dbblock, * dbm_file;
@@ -3956,7 +4109,6 @@ tlsp->tlsa_usage = 0;
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
{
# ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
- /*XXX this should be moved to caller, to be common across gnutls/openssl */
if ( conn_args->dane
&& ob->hosts_request_ocsp[0] == '*'
&& ob->hosts_request_ocsp[1] == '\0'
@@ -3979,6 +4131,15 @@ tlsp->tlsa_usage = 0;
# endif
request_ocsp =
verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
+
+# if defined(SUPPORT_DANE) && !defined(EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_RESP_GET0_SIGNER)
+ if (conn_args->dane && (require_ocsp || request_ocsp))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OpenSSL version to early to combine OCSP"
+ " and DANE; disabling OCSP\n");
+ require_ocsp = request_ocsp = FALSE;
+ }
+# endif
}
#endif
@@ -4050,6 +4211,7 @@ if (conn_args->dane)
tls_error(US"context init", host, NULL, errstr);
return FALSE;
}
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("since dane-mode conn, not loading the usual CA bundle\n");
}
else
@@ -4186,7 +4348,12 @@ if (conn_args->dane)
if (rc <= 0)
{
- tls_error(US"SSL_connect", host, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr);
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+ if (client_static_state->u_ocsp.client.verify_errstr)
+ { if (errstr) *errstr = client_static_state->u_ocsp.client.verify_errstr; }
+ else
+#endif
+ tls_error(US"SSL_connect", host, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr);
return FALSE;
}
@@ -4373,7 +4540,6 @@ tls_get_cache(unsigned lim)
{
#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
int n = ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm - ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm;
-debug_printf("tls_get_cache\n");
if (n > lim)
n = lim;
if (n > 0)
@@ -4633,8 +4799,8 @@ if (do_shutdown > TLS_NO_SHUTDOWN)
if (!o_ctx) /* server side */
{
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
- sk_X509_pop_free(state_server.verify_stack, X509_free);
- state_server.verify_stack = NULL;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(state_server.u_ocsp.server.verify_stack, X509_free);
+ state_server.u_ocsp.server.verify_stack = NULL;
#endif
receive_getc = smtp_getc;
diff --git a/test/aux-fixed/exim-ca/genall b/test/aux-fixed/exim-ca/genall
index 85edfc29c..878c6aba0 100755
--- a/test/aux-fixed/exim-ca/genall
+++ b/test/aux-fixed/exim-ca/genall
@@ -34,9 +34,12 @@ do
# -F create sub-signing cert
# -C CRL
# -O create OCSP responder cert
+ # -3 Authority key ID extension
+ # -8 Subject Alternate Names
+
clica $V -D "$idir" -p password -B 2048 -I -N $iname -F -C http://crl.$iname/latest.crl -O http://oscp.$iname/
- # create server certs
+ # create server leaf certs
# -m <months>
clica $V -D $idir -p password -s 101 -S server1.$iname -m 301 \
-8 alternatename.server1.example.$tld,alternatename2.server1.example.$tld,*.test.ex
diff --git a/test/confs/5840 b/test/confs/5840
index 1b3b122b3..1e6406eaa 100644
--- a/test/confs/5840
+++ b/test/confs/5840
@@ -23,28 +23,23 @@ queue_run_in_order
tls_advertise_hosts = *
-# Set certificate only if server
CDIR1 = DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.net/server1.example.net
CDIR2 = DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com
.ifdef CERT
tls_certificate = CERT
.else
-tls_certificate = ${if eq {SERVER}{server} \
- {${if or {{eq {DETAILS}{ta}} {eq {DETAILS}{ca}} {eq {DETAILS}{ee}}} \
+tls_certificate = ${if or {{eq {DETAILS}{ta}} {eq {DETAILS}{ca}} {eq {DETAILS}{ee}}} \
{CDIR2/fullchain.pem}\
- {CDIR1/fullchain.pem}}}\
- fail}
+ {CDIR1/fullchain.pem}}
.endif
.ifdef ALLOW
tls_privatekey = ALLOW
.else
-tls_privatekey = ${if eq {SERVER}{server} \
- {${if or {{eq {DETAILS}{ta}} {eq {DETAILS}{ca}} {eq {DETAILS}{ee}}} \
+tls_privatekey = ${if or {{eq {DETAILS}{ta}} {eq {DETAILS}{ca}} {eq {DETAILS}{ee}}} \
{CDIR2/server1.example.com.unlocked.key}\
- {CDIR1/server1.example.net.unlocked.key}}}\
- fail}
+ {CDIR1/server1.example.net.unlocked.key}}
.endif
# ----- Routers -----
diff --git a/test/confs/5847 b/test/confs/5847
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9f3277cb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/confs/5847
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+# Exim test configuration 5847
+# OCSP stapling under DANE, client
+
+SERVER =
+
+exim_path = EXIM_PATH
+keep_environment = ^EXIM_TESTHARNESS_DISABLE_[O]CSPVALIDITYCHECK$
+host_lookup_order = bydns
+spool_directory = DIR/spool
+log_file_path = DIR/spool/log/SERVER%slog
+gecos_pattern = ""
+gecos_name = CALLER_NAME
+chunking_advertise_hosts =
+primary_hostname = server1.example.com
+
+.ifdef _HAVE_DMARC
+dmarc_tld_file =
+.endif
+
+
+# ----- Main settings -----
+
+domainlist local_domains = test.ex : *.test.ex
+
+.ifndef OPT
+acl_smtp_rcpt = check_recipient
+.else
+acl_smtp_rcpt = accept verify = recipient/callout
+.endif
+acl_smtp_data = check_data
+
+log_selector = +received_recipients +tls_peerdn +tls_certificate_verified +tls_sni
+remote_max_parallel = 1
+queue_run_in_order
+
+tls_advertise_hosts = *
+
+CDIR1 = DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.net/server1.example.net
+CDIR2 = DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com
+
+.ifdef CERT
+tls_certificate = CERT
+.else
+tls_certificate = ${if or {{eq {DETAILS}{ta}} {eq {DETAILS}{ca}} {eq {DETAILS}{ee}}} \
+ {CDIR2/fullchain.pem}\
+ {CDIR1/fullchain.pem}}
+.endif
+
+.ifdef ALLOW
+tls_privatekey = ALLOW
+.else
+tls_privatekey = ${if or {{eq {DETAILS}{ta}} {eq {DETAILS}{ca}} {eq {DETAILS}{ee}}} \
+ {CDIR2/server1.example.com.unlocked.key}\
+ {CDIR1/server1.example.net.unlocked.key}}
+.endif
+
+tls_ocsp_file = RETURN
+
+
+# ------ ACL ------
+
+begin acl
+
+check_recipient:
+ accept domains = +local_domains
+ deny message = relay not permitted
+
+check_data:
+ warn condition = ${if def:h_X-TLS-out:}
+ logwrite = client claims: $h_X-TLS-out:
+ accept
+
+# ----- Routers -----
+
+begin routers
+
+client:
+ driver = dnslookup
+ condition = ${if eq {SERVER}{server}{no}{yes}}
+ dnssec_request_domains = *
+ self = send
+ retry_use_local_part
+ transport = send_to_server${if eq{$local_part}{norequest}{1} \
+ {${if eq{$local_part}{norequire} {2} \
+ {3} \
+ }}}
+ errors_to = ""
+
+server:
+ driver = redirect
+ data = :blackhole:
+
+
+# ----- Transports -----
+
+begin transports
+
+ # nostaple
+send_to_server1:
+ driver = smtp
+ allow_localhost
+ port = PORT_D
+ hosts_try_fastopen = :
+ tls_verify_certificates = ${if eq {DETAILS}{ca} {CDIR2/ca_chain.pem} {}}
+ tls_verify_cert_hostnames = ${if eq {OPT}{no_certname} {}{*}}
+ hosts_try_dane = *
+ hosts_require_tls = *
+ hosts_request_ocsp = :
+ headers_add = X-TLS-out: ocsp status $tls_out_ocsp \
+ (${listextract {${eval:$tls_out_ocsp+1}} {notreq:notresp:vfynotdone:failed:verified}})
+
+ # norequire
+send_to_server2:
+ driver = smtp
+ allow_localhost
+ port = PORT_D
+ hosts_try_fastopen = :
+ tls_verify_certificates = ${if eq {DETAILS}{ca} {CDIR2/ca_chain.pem} {}}
+ tls_verify_cert_hostnames = ${if eq {OPT}{no_certname} {}{*}}
+ hosts_try_dane = *
+ hosts_require_tls = *
+# note no ocsp mention here
+ headers_add = X-TLS-out: ocsp status $tls_out_ocsp \
+ (${listextract {${eval:$tls_out_ocsp+1}} {notreq:notresp:vfynotdone:failed:verified}})
+
+# default
+send_to_server3:
+ driver = smtp
+ allow_localhost
+ port = PORT_D
+ hosts_try_fastopen = :
+ helo_data = helo.data.changed
+ tls_verify_certificates = ${if eq {DETAILS}{ca} {CDIR2/ca_chain.pem} {}}
+ tls_verify_cert_hostnames = ${if eq {OPT}{no_certname} {}{*}}
+ hosts_try_dane = *
+ hosts_require_tls = *
+ hosts_require_ocsp = *
+ headers_add = X-TLS-out: ocsp status $tls_out_ocsp \
+ (${listextract {${eval:$tls_out_ocsp+1}} {notreq:notresp:vfynotdone:failed:verified}})
+
+
+# ----- Retry -----
+
+
+begin retry
+
+* * F,5d,1s
+
+
+# End
diff --git a/test/log/5601 b/test/log/5601
index 6bdac8712..471acd45c 100644
--- a/test/log/5601
+++ b/test/log/5601
@@ -9,13 +9,13 @@
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbB-0005vi-00 Completed
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbD-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@??? U=CALLER P=local S=sss for nostaple_required@???
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbD-0005vi-00 Required TLS certificate status not received
-1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbD-0005vi-00 == nostaple_required@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1]: TLS session: (SSL_connect): error: <<detail omitted>>
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbD-0005vi-00 == nostaple_required@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1]: TLS session: (SSL_connect) Required TLS certificate status not received
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbE-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@??? U=CALLER P=local S=sss for revoked@???
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbE-0005vi-00 Server certificate revoked; reason: superseded
-1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbE-0005vi-00 == revoked@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1]: TLS session: (SSL_connect): error: <<detail omitted>>
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbE-0005vi-00 == revoked@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1]: TLS session: (SSL_connect) Server certificate revoked
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbF-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@??? U=CALLER P=local S=sss for expired@???
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbF-0005vi-00 OCSP dates invalid
-1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbF-0005vi-00 == expired@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1]: TLS session: (SSL_connect): error: <<detail omitted>>
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbF-0005vi-00 == expired@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1]: TLS session: (SSL_connect) Server certificate status is out-of-date
******** SERVER ********
1999-03-02 09:44:33 exim x.yz daemon started: pid=p1234, no queue runs, listening for SMTP on port PORT_D
diff --git a/test/log/5611 b/test/log/5611
index bb4349560..1def09191 100644
--- a/test/log/5611
+++ b/test/log/5611
@@ -9,13 +9,13 @@
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbA-0005vi-00 Completed
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbD-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@??? U=CALLER P=local S=sss for lack_required@???
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbD-0005vi-00 Required TLS certificate status not received
-1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbD-0005vi-00 == lack_required@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1]: TLS session: (SSL_connect): error: <<detail omitted>>
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbD-0005vi-00 == lack_required@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1]: TLS session: (SSL_connect) Required TLS certificate status not received
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbE-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@??? U=CALLER P=local S=sss for revoved@???
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbE-0005vi-00 Server certificate revoked; reason: superseded
-1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbE-0005vi-00 == revoved@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1]: TLS session: (SSL_connect): error: <<detail omitted>>
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbE-0005vi-00 == revoved@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1]: TLS session: (SSL_connect) Server certificate revoked
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbF-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@??? U=CALLER P=local S=sss for expired@???
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbF-0005vi-00 OCSP dates invalid
-1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbF-0005vi-00 == expired@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1]: TLS session: (SSL_connect): error: <<detail omitted>>
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbF-0005vi-00 == expired@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1]: TLS session: (SSL_connect) Server certificate status is out-of-date
******** SERVER ********
1999-03-02 09:44:33 exim x.yz daemon started: pid=p1234, no queue runs, listening for SMTP on port PORT_D
diff --git a/test/log/5740 b/test/log/5740
index 88e4a46bb..f8a6c8d23 100644
--- a/test/log/5740
+++ b/test/log/5740
@@ -17,15 +17,15 @@
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbF-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@??? U=CALLER P=local S=sss for failrequire@???
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbF-0005vi-00 Required TLS certificate status not received
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbF-0005vi-00 client ocsp status: 1 (notresp)
-1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbF-0005vi-00 == failrequire@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1]: TLS session: (SSL_connect): error: <<detail omitted>>
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbF-0005vi-00 == failrequire@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1]: TLS session: (SSL_connect) Required TLS certificate status not received
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbG-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@??? U=CALLER P=local S=sss for failrevoked@???
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbG-0005vi-00 Server certificate revoked; reason: superseded
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbG-0005vi-00 client ocsp status: 3 (failed)
-1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbG-0005vi-00 == failrevoked@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1]: TLS session: (SSL_connect): error: <<detail omitted>>
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbG-0005vi-00 == failrevoked@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1]: TLS session: (SSL_connect) Server certificate revoked
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbH-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@??? U=CALLER P=local S=sss for failexpired@???
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbH-0005vi-00 OCSP dates invalid
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbH-0005vi-00 client ocsp status: 3 (failed)
-1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbH-0005vi-00 == failexpired@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1]: TLS session: (SSL_connect): error: <<detail omitted>>
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbH-0005vi-00 == failexpired@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1]: TLS session: (SSL_connect) Server certificate status is out-of-date
******** SERVER ********
1999-03-02 09:44:33 exim x.yz daemon started: pid=p1234, no queue runs, listening for SMTP on port PORT_D
diff --git a/test/log/5847 b/test/log/5847
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4f8632640
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/log/5847
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaX-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@??? U=CALLER P=local S=sss for norequire@???
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaX-0005vi-00 => norequire@??? R=client T=send_to_server2 H=dane256tak.test.ex [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] X=TLS1.x:ke-RSA-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx CV=dane DN="/CN=server1.example.com" C="250 OK id=10HmaY-0005vi-00"
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaX-0005vi-00 Completed
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaZ-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@??? U=CALLER P=local S=sss for norequest@???
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaZ-0005vi-00 => norequest@??? R=client T=send_to_server1 H=dane256tak.test.ex [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] X=TLS1.x:ke-RSA-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx CV=dane DN="/CN=server1.example.com" C="250 OK id=10HmbA-0005vi-00"
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaZ-0005vi-00 Completed
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbB-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@??? U=CALLER P=local S=sss for goodstaple@???
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbB-0005vi-00 => goodstaple@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 H=dane256tak.test.ex [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] X=TLS1.x:ke-RSA-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx CV=dane DN="/CN=server1.example.com" C="250 OK id=10HmbC-0005vi-00"
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbB-0005vi-00 Completed
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbD-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@??? U=CALLER P=local S=sss for nostaple_required@???
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbD-0005vi-00 Required TLS certificate status not received
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbD-0005vi-00 DANE attempt failed; TLS connection to dane256tak.test.ex [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4]: (SSL_connect) Required TLS certificate status not received
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbD-0005vi-00 == nostaple_required@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=dane256tak.test.ex [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4]: TLS session: (SSL_connect) Required TLS certificate status not received
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbE-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@??? U=CALLER P=local S=sss for revoked@???
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbE-0005vi-00 Server certificate revoked; reason: superseded
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbE-0005vi-00 DANE attempt failed; TLS connection to dane256tak.test.ex [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4]: (SSL_connect) Server certificate revoked
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbE-0005vi-00 == revoked@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=dane256tak.test.ex [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4]: TLS session: (SSL_connect) Server certificate revoked
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbF-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@??? U=CALLER P=local S=sss for expired@???
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbF-0005vi-00 OCSP dates invalid
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbF-0005vi-00 DANE attempt failed; TLS connection to dane256tak.test.ex [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4]: (SSL_connect) Server certificate status is out-of-date
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbF-0005vi-00 == expired@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 defer (-37) H=dane256tak.test.ex [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4]: TLS session: (SSL_connect) Server certificate status is out-of-date
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbG-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@??? U=CALLER P=local S=sss for goodstaple_le@???
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbG-0005vi-00 => goodstaple_le@??? R=client T=send_to_server3 H=dane256tak.test.ex [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] X=TLS1.x:ke-RSA-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx CV=dane DN="/CN=server1.example.com" C="250 OK id=10HmbH-0005vi-00"
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbG-0005vi-00 Completed
+
+******** SERVER ********
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 exim x.yz daemon started: pid=p1234, no queue runs, listening for SMTP on port PORT_D
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaY-0005vi-00 client claims: ocsp status 1 (notresp)
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaY-0005vi-00 <= <> H=the.local.host.name (server1.example.com) [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] P=esmtps X=TLS1.x:ke-RSA-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx CV=no SNI=dane256tak.test.ex S=sss id=E10HmaX-0005vi-00@??? for norequire@???
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaY-0005vi-00 => :blackhole: <norequire@???> R=server
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaY-0005vi-00 Completed
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 exim x.yz daemon started: pid=p1235, no queue runs, listening for SMTP on port PORT_D
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbA-0005vi-00 client claims: ocsp status 0 (notreq)
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbA-0005vi-00 <= <> H=the.local.host.name (server1.example.com) [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] P=esmtps X=TLS1.x:ke-RSA-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx CV=no SNI=dane256tak.test.ex S=sss id=E10HmaZ-0005vi-00@??? for norequest@???
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbA-0005vi-00 => :blackhole: <norequest@???> R=server
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbA-0005vi-00 Completed
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbC-0005vi-00 client claims: ocsp status 4 (verified)
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbC-0005vi-00 <= <> H=(helo.data.changed) [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] P=esmtps X=TLS1.x:ke-RSA-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx CV=no SNI=dane256tak.test.ex S=sss id=E10HmbB-0005vi-00@??? for goodstaple@???
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbC-0005vi-00 => :blackhole: <goodstaple@???> R=server
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbC-0005vi-00 Completed
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 exim x.yz daemon started: pid=p1236, no queue runs, listening for SMTP on port PORT_D
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 TLS error on connection from (helo.data.changed) [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] (SSL_accept): error: <<detail omitted>>
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 exim x.yz daemon started: pid=p1237, no queue runs, listening for SMTP on port PORT_D
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 TLS error on connection from (helo.data.changed) [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] (SSL_accept): error: <<detail omitted>>
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 exim x.yz daemon started: pid=p1238, no queue runs, listening for SMTP on port PORT_D
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 TLS error on connection from (helo.data.changed) [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] (SSL_accept): error: <<detail omitted>>
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 exim x.yz daemon started: pid=p1239, no queue runs, listening for SMTP on port PORT_D
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbH-0005vi-00 client claims: ocsp status 4 (verified)
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbH-0005vi-00 <= <> H=(helo.data.changed) [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] P=esmtps X=TLS1.x:ke-RSA-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx CV=no SNI=dane256tak.test.ex S=sss id=E10HmbG-0005vi-00@??? for goodstaple_le@???
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbH-0005vi-00 => :blackhole: <goodstaple_le@???> R=server
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbH-0005vi-00 Completed
diff --git a/test/scripts/5846-DANE-OpenSSL-OCSP/5847 b/test/scripts/5846-DANE-OpenSSL-OCSP/5847
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0916bd97a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/scripts/5846-DANE-OpenSSL-OCSP/5847
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+# OCSP stapling under DANE, client
+#
+#
+# ============================================
+# Group 1: TLSA (2 1 1) (DANE-TA SPKI SHA2-256)
+#
+# Client works when we request but don't require OCSP stapling and none comes
+exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server -DDETAILS=ta -DRETURN=""
+****
+exim -odf norequire@???
+****
+killdaemon
+#
+#
+#
+#
+# Client works when we don't request OCSP stapling
+exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server -DDETAILS=ta \
+ -DRETURN=DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.good.resp
+****
+exim -odf norequest@???
+****
+#
+#
+#
+#
+# Client accepts good stapled info
+exim -odf goodstaple@???
+****
+killdaemon
+#
+#
+#
+# Client fails on lack of required stapled info
+exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server -DDETAILS=ta -DRETURN=""
+****
+exim -odf nostaple_required@???
+****
+killdaemon
+sudo rm -f spool/db/retry* spool/input/*
+#
+#
+#
+# Client fails on revoked stapled info
+EXIM_TESTHARNESS_DISABLE_OCSPVALIDITYCHECK=y exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server -DDETAILS=ta \
+ -DRETURN=DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.revoked.resp
+****
+exim -odf revoked@???
+****
+killdaemon
+sudo rm -f spool/db/retry* spool/input/*
+#
+#
+#
+#
+# Client fails on expired stapled info
+EXIM_TESTHARNESS_DISABLE_OCSPVALIDITYCHECK=y exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server -DDETAILS=ta \
+ -DRETURN=DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.dated.resp
+****
+exim -odf expired@???
+****
+killdaemon
+sudo rm -f spool/db/retry* spool/input/*
+#
+#
+# ============================================
+# Group 2: TLSA (2 1 1) (DANE-TA SPKI SHA2-256) but with LE-mode OCSP
+#
+exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server -DDETAILS=ta \
+ -DRETURN=DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.signernocert.good.resp
+****
+#
+# Client accepts good stapled info
+exim -odf goodstaple_le@???
+****
+killdaemon
+#
+no_msglog_check
diff --git a/test/scripts/5846-DANE-OpenSSL-OCSP/REQUIRES b/test/scripts/5846-DANE-OpenSSL-OCSP/REQUIRES
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fa226f8e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/scripts/5846-DANE-OpenSSL-OCSP/REQUIRES
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+support DANE
+support OpenSSL
+support OCSP
+running IPv4
diff --git a/test/stderr/5840 b/test/stderr/5840
index 6cae7d46e..35e6c22e2 100644
--- a/test/stderr/5840
+++ b/test/stderr/5840
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
>>> host in helo_try_verify_hosts? no (option unset)
>>> host in helo_accept_junk_hosts? no (option unset)
>>> test in helo_lookup_domains? no (end of list)
->>> processing "accept" (TESTSUITE/test-config 93)
+>>> processing "accept" (TESTSUITE/test-config 88)
>>> check verify = recipient/callout
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> routing rcptuser@???
