[pcre-dev] [Bug 852] Do not reset hard limit for coredump si…

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Autor: admin
Data:  
A: pcre-dev
Assumpte: [pcre-dev] [Bug 852] Do not reset hard limit for coredump size
https://bugs.exim.org/show_bug.cgi?id=852

rapepav820 <rapepav820@???> changed:

           What    |Removed                     |Added
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Resolution|---                         |FIXED
             Status|NEW                         |RESOLVED


--- Comment #2 from rapepav820 <rapepav820@???> ---
(In reply to Phil Pennock from comment #1)
> We already have bug 834 in which I provided a patch to implement a
> permit_coredump option on pipe transports, where this does work.
>
> If you're permitting coredumps to be raised by using the soft limit, then
> there's a security issue when Exim has read in getpwent data with passwords
> (on various systems) or other cases where it still has this sort of data in
> memory; then once it has setuid() to an end-user, the end-user triggers a
> core-dump (via signal). Thus changing the option globally like this seems a
> bad idea.
>
> I for one would be happier if this was changed to add a
> system_filter_permit_coredump option and recoded to limit the situations in
> which a core-dump can happen.


The latest version of PCRE (pcre2-10.34-RC1, pcre2-10.33) is prone to a stack
http://www.sprite-ideas.com/
overflow vulnerability in internal_dfa_match() (pcre2_dfa_match.c) which can be
triggered using a crafted regular expression. Upon execution of the crafted
regular expression, the function internal_dfa_match() calls itself recursively,
resulting into uncontrolled recursion. It exceeds the stack size limit (8 MB),
finally resulting into stack exhaustion. An attacker can potentially exploit
this issue to perform remote code execution or denial of service attack.

=====================
Output of ASAN compiled library (-fsanitize=address)

Run as: ./pcre2test sbovf-input (attached herewith)
http://www.componentanalysis.org/

--------------------
ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL

==17245==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0x7fffff7feff8 (pc
0x5555555afcc7 bp 0x7fffff7ff4b0 sp 0x7fffff7fefe0 T0)
    #0 0x5555555afcc6 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2859
    #1 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
    #2 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
http://www.environmentaleducationnews.com/
    #3 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
    #4 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
    #5 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
    #6 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
    #7 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
http://toscanoandsonsblog.com/
    #8 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
    #9 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
    #10 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
    ...
    <skipped>
    ...
    #240 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
    #241 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
http://www.mic-sound.net/
    #242 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
    #243 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
    #244 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
http://www.craftpatternwarehouse.com/
    #245 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
    #246 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
    #247 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
    #248 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
    #249 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871
    #250 0x5555555b4020 in internal_dfa_match src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2871






SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:2859 in
internal_dfa_match http://www.slipstone.co.uk/
==17245==ABORTING

====================
With gdb
--------------------
$ gdb ./pcre2test http://www.bigeasydesarucoast.com/

(gdb) r sbovf-input
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x00005555555aaab4 in internal_dfa_match (mb=mb@entry=0x7fffffff5800,
this_start_code=this_start_code@entry=0x611000000acf "\210", 
    current_subject=current_subject@entry=0x629000002eb1 '\200' <repeats 200
times>..., http://matslideborg.com/
start_offset=start_offset@entry=6522, offsets=offsets@entry=0x7fffec780030,
offsetcount=offsetcount@entry=1000, https://www.hr-itconsulting.tech/




http://www.izidil.com/ workspace=0x7fffec781f70, wscount=1000,
rlevel=6522, RWS=0x7fffeb8c5800) at src/pcre2_dfa_match.c:533
http://padreislandtv.com/




The latest version of PCRE (pcre2-10.34-RC1, pcre2-10.33) is prone to a stack
overflow vulnerability http://www.dontfuckwiththeearth.com/ in
internal_dfa_match()
(pcre2_dfa_match.c) which can be triggered using a crafted regular expression.
Upon execution of the crafted regular expression, the function
internal_dfa_match() http://openbsdvps.net/ calls itself recursively,
resulting into uncontrolled recursion. http://www.artofcharlesgriffith.com/It
exceeds the stack size limit (8 MB),
finally resulting into stack exhaustion. An attacker can potentially exploit
this issue to perform http://www.griintravel.com/ remote code execution or
denial
of service attack.

SOURCE
http://www.lanavebruja.com/
http://www.nzhorses.co.nz/
http://www.heurisko.co.nz/
http://www.totalregistrations.co/
https://www.waterspumpingservices.co.nz
http://fb.tiranna.org/
http://fb.tiranna.org/essences.html
https://www.laikadesign.net/
http://www.osubg.org/
http://www.english-for-winners.com/

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