[exim-cvs] GnuTLS 3.6.7 cipher strings

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Szerző: Exim Git Commits Mailing List
Dátum: 2019-04-25 17:17 -000
Címzett: exim-cvs
Tárgy: [exim-cvs] GnuTLS 3.6.7 cipher strings
Gitweb: https://git.exim.org/exim.git/commitdiff/d9acfc1ce677f0bfd16f1555f3762af13b8e5a7b
Commit:     d9acfc1ce677f0bfd16f1555f3762af13b8e5a7b
Parent:     eb2fb50d46b0a27db9ccc32d3f4f32ece817402c
Author:     Jeremy Harris <jgh146exb@???>
AuthorDate: Thu Apr 25 17:07:35 2019 +0100
Committer:  Jeremy Harris <jgh146exb@???>
CommitDate: Thu Apr 25 17:59:39 2019 +0100


    GnuTLS 3.6.7 cipher strings
---
 doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog |  9 +++++++++
 src/src/tls-gnu.c     | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 test/log/5821         |  4 ++--
 test/runtest          | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)


diff --git a/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog b/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog
index 2c57ce6..a85841a 100644
--- a/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog
+++ b/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog
@@ -80,6 +80,15 @@ HS/02 Bug 2392: exigrep does case sensitive *option* processing (as it
 JH/15 Use unsigned when creating bitmasks in macros, to avoid build errors
       on some platforms for bit 31.


+JH/16 GnuTLS: rework ciphersuite strings under recent library versions.  Thanks
+      to changes apparently associated with TLS1.3 handling some of the APIs
+      previously used were either nonfunctional or inappropriate.  Strings
+      like TLS1.3:ECDHE_SECP256R1__RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256__AES_256_GCM__AEAD:256
+      and TLS1.2:ECDHE_SECP256R1__RSA_SHA256__AES_128_CBC__SHA256:128 replace
+      the previous TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256 .
+      This affects log line X= elements, the $tls_{in,out}_cipher variables,
+      and the use of specific cipher names in the encrypted= ACL condition.
+


Exim version 4.92
-----------------
diff --git a/src/src/tls-gnu.c b/src/src/tls-gnu.c
index 7fc88c0..abf2c25 100644
--- a/src/src/tls-gnu.c
+++ b/src/src/tls-gnu.c
@@ -1516,11 +1516,40 @@ state->peerdn = NULL;
cipher = gnutls_cipher_get(state->session);
protocol = gnutls_protocol_get_version(state->session);
mac = gnutls_mac_get(state->session);
-kx = gnutls_kx_get(state->session);
+kx = protocol < GNUTLS_TLS1_3 ? gnutls_kx_get(state->session) : 0;

 old_pool = store_pool;
   {
   store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+
+#ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_SESS_DESC
+    {
+    gstring * g = NULL;
+    uschar * s = US gnutls_session_get_desc(state->session), c;
+
+    /* Nikos M suggests we use this by preference.  It returns like:
+    (TLS1.3)-(ECDHE-SECP256R1)-(RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA256)-(AES-256-GCM)
+
+    For partial back-compat, put a colon after the TLS version, replace the
+    )-( grouping with __, replace in-group - with _ and append the :keysize. */
+
+    /* debug_printf("peer_status: gnutls_session_get_desc %s\n", s); */
+
+    for (s++; (c = *s) && c != ')'; s++) g = string_catn(g, s, 1);
+    g = string_catn(g, US":", 1);
+    if (*s) s++;        /* now on _ between groups */
+    while ((c = *s))
+      {
+      for (*++s && ++s; (c = *s) && c != ')'; s++) g = string_catn(g, c == '-' ? US"_" : s, 1);
+      /* now on ) closing group */
+      if ((c = *s) && *++s == '-') g = string_catn(g, US"__", 2);
+      /* now on _ between groups */
+      }
+    g = string_catn(g, US":", 1);
+    g = string_cat(g, string_sprintf("%d", (int) gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8));
+    state->ciphersuite = string_from_gstring(g);
+    }
+#else
   state->ciphersuite = string_sprintf("%s:%s:%d",
       gnutls_protocol_get_name(protocol),
       gnutls_cipher_suite_get_name(kx, cipher, mac),
@@ -1531,7 +1560,12 @@ old_pool = store_pool;
   releases did return "TLS 1.0"; play it safe, just in case. */


for (uschar * p = state->ciphersuite; *p; p++) if (isspace(*p)) *p = '-';
+#endif
+
+/* debug_printf("peer_status: ciphersuite %s\n", state->ciphersuite); */
+
state->tlsp->cipher = state->ciphersuite;
+ state->tlsp->bits = gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8;

state->tlsp->cipher_stdname = cipher_stdname_kcm(kx, cipher, mac);
}
diff --git a/test/log/5821 b/test/log/5821
index d94c7c6..98282ec 100644
--- a/test/log/5821
+++ b/test/log/5821
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbB-0005vi-00 => CALLER@??? R=client T=send_to_server H=localhost.test.ex [127.0.0.1] X=TLS1.x:ke-RSA-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx CV=yes DN="CN=server1.example.com" C="250 OK id=10HmbC-0005vi-00"
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbB-0005vi-00 Completed
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbD-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@??? U=CALLER P=local S=sss for CALLER@???
-1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbD-0005vi-00 => CALLER@??? R=client T=send_to_server H=dane256ee.test.ex [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] X=TLS1.2:RSA_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384:256 CV=dane DN="CN=server1.example.com" C="250 OK id=10HmbE-0005vi-00"
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbD-0005vi-00 => CALLER@??? R=client T=send_to_server H=dane256ee.test.ex [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] X=TLS1.2:RSA_CAMELLIA_256_GCM-SHAnnn:256 CV=dane DN="CN=server1.example.com" C="250 OK id=10HmbE-0005vi-00"
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbD-0005vi-00 Completed

******** SERVER ********
@@ -26,6 +26,6 @@
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbC-0005vi-00 => :blackhole: <CALLER@???> R=server
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbC-0005vi-00 Completed
1999-03-02 09:44:33 "rcpt ACL"
-1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbE-0005vi-00 <= <> H=the.local.host.name (myhost.test.ex) [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] P=esmtps X=TLS1.2:RSA_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384:256 CV=no S=sss id=E10HmbD-0005vi-00@??? for CALLER@???
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbE-0005vi-00 <= <> H=the.local.host.name (myhost.test.ex) [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] P=esmtps X=TLS1.2:RSA_CAMELLIA_256_GCM-SHAnnn:256 CV=no S=sss id=E10HmbD-0005vi-00@??? for CALLER@???
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbE-0005vi-00 => :blackhole: <CALLER@???> R=server
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbE-0005vi-00 Completed
diff --git a/test/runtest b/test/runtest
index 3b572c1..d7e4325 100755
--- a/test/runtest
+++ b/test/runtest
@@ -604,11 +604,18 @@ RESET_AFTER_EXTRA_LINE_READ:

   # GnuTLS have seen:
   #   TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256
+  #   TLS1.3:ECDHE_SECP256R1__RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256__AES_256_GCM__AEAD:256
+  #   TLS1.3:ECDHE_X25519__RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256__AES_256_GCM:256
+  #   TLS1.3:ECDHE_PSK_SECP256R1__AES_256_GCM__AEAD:256
   #
   #   TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256
   #   TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128
   #   TLS1.2:RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256 (canonical)
   #   TLS1.2:DHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:128
+  #   TLS1.2:ECDHE_SECP256R1__RSA_SHA256__AES_256_GCM:256
+  #   TLS1.2:ECDHE_SECP256R1__RSA_SHA256__AES_128_CBC__SHA256:128
+  #   TLS1.2:ECDHE_SECP256R1__ECDSA_SHA512__AES_256_GCM:256
+  #   TLS1.2:RSA__CAMELLIA_256_GCM:256    (leave the cipher name)
   #
   #   X=TLS1.2:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:256
   #   X=TLS1.2:RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256
@@ -620,7 +627,17 @@ RESET_AFTER_EXTRA_LINE_READ:
   #   DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
   # picking latter as canonical simply because regex easier that way.
   s/\bDHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:128/RSA-AES256-SHA1:256/g;
-  s/TLS1.[0123]:((EC)?DHE_)?(RSA|ECDSA)_AES_(256|128)_(CBC|GCM)_SHA(1|256|384):(256|128)/TLS1.x:ke-$3-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx/g;
+  s/TLS1.[0123]:                        # TLS version
+    ((EC)?DHE(_((?<psk>PSK)_)?(SECP256R1|X25519))?__?)?    # key-exchange
+    ((?<auth>RSA|ECDSA)((_PSS_RSAE)?_SHA(512|256))?__?)?    # authentication
+    AES_(256|128)_(CBC|GCM)                    # cipher
+    (__?SHA(1|256|384))?:                    # PRF
+    (256|128)                        # cipher strength
+    /"TLS1.x:ke-"
+    . (defined($+{psk}) ? $+{psk} : "")
+    . (defined($+{auth}) ? $+{auth} : "")
+    . "-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx"/genx;
+  s/TLS1.2:RSA__CAMELLIA_256_GCM(_SHA384)?:256/TLS1.2:RSA_CAMELLIA_256_GCM-SHAnnn:256/g;
   s/\b(ECDHE-(RSA|ECDSA)-AES256-SHA|DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256)\b/ke-$2-AES256-SHAnnn/g;


# GnuTLS library error message changes