Gitweb:
http://git.exim.org/exim.git/commitdiff/f69979cfecf29a4910b5750cad41d21a5418c6c7
Commit: f69979cfecf29a4910b5750cad41d21a5418c6c7
Parent: 6a91042821c706b631961bf510c6b209b9a650fb
Author: Jeremy Harris <jgh146exb@???>
AuthorDate: Sat Feb 14 18:48:47 2015 +0000
Committer: Jeremy Harris <jgh146exb@???>
CommitDate: Sat Feb 14 19:48:14 2015 +0000
OpenSSL: Capture peercert/dn in mainline not verify-callback. Bug 1571
---
doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt | 8 ++
doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog | 3 +
src/src/tls-openssl.c | 226 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
src/src/verify.c | 2 +-
test/confs/2114 | 4 +-
5 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt b/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt
index d1e6571..a112ec7 100644
--- a/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt
+++ b/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt
@@ -12451,6 +12451,8 @@ inbound connection when the message was received.
It is only useful as the argument of a
&%certextract%& expansion item, &%md5%&, &%sha1%& or &%sha256%& operator,
or a &%def%& condition.
+If certificate verification fails it may refer to a failing chain element
+which is not the leaf.
.vitem &$tls_out_ourcert$&
.vindex "&$tls_out_ourcert$&"
@@ -12465,6 +12467,8 @@ This variable refers to the certificate presented by the peer of an
outbound connection. It is only useful as the argument of a
&%certextract%& expansion item, &%md5%&, &%sha1%& or &%sha256%& operator,
or a &%def%& condition.
+If certificate verification fails it may refer to a failing chain element
+which is not the leaf.
.vitem &$tls_in_certificate_verified$&
.vindex "&$tls_in_certificate_verified$&"
@@ -12528,6 +12532,8 @@ When a message is received from a remote host over an encrypted SMTP
connection, and Exim is configured to request a certificate from the client,
the value of the Distinguished Name of the certificate is made available in the
&$tls_in_peerdn$& during subsequent processing.
+If certificate verification fails it may refer to a failing chain element
+which is not the leaf.
The deprecated &$tls_peerdn$& variable refers to the inbound side
except when used in the context of an outbound SMTP delivery, when it refers to
@@ -12539,6 +12545,8 @@ When a message is being delivered to a remote host over an encrypted SMTP
connection, and Exim is configured to request a certificate from the server,
the value of the Distinguished Name of the certificate is made available in the
&$tls_out_peerdn$& during subsequent processing.
+If certificate verification fails it may refer to a failing chain element
+which is not the leaf.
.vitem &$tls_in_sni$&
.vindex "&$tls_in_sni$&"
diff --git a/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog b/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog
index c2959d3..0548674 100644
--- a/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog
+++ b/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog
@@ -70,6 +70,9 @@ JH/18 Bug 1581: Router and transport options headers_add/remove can
JH/19 Bug 392: spamd_address, and clamd av_scanner, now support retry
option values.
+JH/20 BUG 1571: Ensure that $tls_in_peerdn is set, when verification fails
+ under OpenSSL.
+
Exim version 4.85
diff --git a/src/src/tls-openssl.c b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
index ee16bdc..96ac72c 100644
--- a/src/src/tls-openssl.c
+++ b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ for(i= 0; i<sk_X509_OBJECT_num(roots); i++)
{
X509 * current_cert= tmp_obj->data.x509;
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(current_cert), CS name, sizeof(name));
- txt[sizeof(name)-1] = '\0';
+ name[sizeof(name)-1] = '\0';
debug_printf(" %s\n", name);
}
}
@@ -254,21 +254,58 @@ for(i= 0; i<sk_X509_OBJECT_num(roots); i++)
*/
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+static int
+verify_event(tls_support * tlsp, X509 * cert, int depth, const uschar * dn,
+ BOOL *calledp, const BOOL *optionalp, const uschar * what)
+{
+uschar * ev;
+uschar * yield;
+X509 * old_cert;
+
+ev = tlsp == &tls_out ? client_static_cbinfo->event_action : event_action;
+if (ev)
+ {
+ old_cert = tlsp->peercert;
+ tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
+ /* NB we do not bother setting peerdn */
+ if ((yield = event_raise(ev, US"tls:cert", string_sprintf("%d", depth))))
+ {
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] %s verify denied by event-action: "
+ "depth=%d cert=%s: %s",
+ tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
+ what, depth, dn, yield);
+ *calledp = TRUE;
+ if (!*optionalp)
+ {
+ if (old_cert) tlsp->peercert = old_cert; /* restore 1st failing cert */
+ return 1; /* reject (leaving peercert set) */
+ }
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Event-action verify failure overridden "
+ "(host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
+ }
+ X509_free(tlsp->peercert);
+ tlsp->peercert = old_cert;
+ }
+return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
/*************************************************
* Callback for verification *
*************************************************/
/* The SSL library does certificate verification if set up to do so. This
callback has the current yes/no state is in "state". If verification succeeded,
-we set up the tls_peerdn string. If verification failed, what happens depends
-on whether the client is required to present a verifiable certificate or not.
+we set the certificate-verified flag. If verification failed, what happens
+depends on whether the client is required to present a verifiable certificate
+or not.
If verification is optional, we change the state to yes, but still log the
verification error. For some reason (it really would help to have proper
documentation of OpenSSL), this callback function then gets called again, this
-time with state = 1. In fact, that's useful, because we can set up the peerdn
-value, but we must take care not to set the private verified flag on the second
-time through.
+time with state = 1. We must take care not to set the private verified flag on
+the second time through.
Note: this function is not called if the client fails to present a certificate
when asked. We get here only if a certificate has been received. Handling of
@@ -292,14 +329,10 @@ verify_callback(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx,
{
X509 * cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509ctx);
int depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx);
-static uschar txt[256];
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
-uschar * ev;
-uschar * yield;
-#endif
+uschar dn[256];
-X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS txt, sizeof(txt));
-txt[sizeof(txt)-1] = '\0';
+X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS dn, sizeof(dn));
+dn[sizeof(dn)-1] = '\0';
if (state == 0)
{
@@ -307,12 +340,13 @@ if (state == 0)
tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
depth,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x509ctx)),
- txt);
+ dn);
*calledp = TRUE;
if (!*optionalp)
{
- tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
- return 0; /* reject */
+ if (!tlsp->peercert)
+ tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert); /* record failing cert */
+ return 0; /* reject */
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
"tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
@@ -320,7 +354,7 @@ if (state == 0)
else if (depth != 0)
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify ok: depth=%d SN=%s\n", depth, txt);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify ok: depth=%d SN=%s\n", depth, dn);
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
if (tlsp == &tls_out && client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store)
{ /* client, wanting stapling */
@@ -333,46 +367,26 @@ else if (depth != 0)
}
#endif
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
- ev = tlsp == &tls_out ? client_static_cbinfo->event_action : event_action;
- if (ev)
- {
- tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
- if ((yield = event_raise(ev, US"tls:cert", string_sprintf("%d", depth))))
- {
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify denied by event-action: "
- "depth=%d cert=%s: %s",
- tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
- depth, txt, yield);
- *calledp = TRUE;
- if (!*optionalp)
- return 0; /* reject */
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Event-action verify failure overridden "
- "(host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
- }
- X509_free(tlsp->peercert);
- tlsp->peercert = NULL;
- }
+ if (verify_event(tlsp, cert, depth, dn, calledp, optionalp, US"SSL"))
+ return 0; /* reject, with peercert set */
#endif
}
else
{
const uschar * verify_cert_hostnames;
- tlsp->peerdn = txt;
- tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
-
if ( tlsp == &tls_out
&& ((verify_cert_hostnames = client_static_cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames)))
/* client, wanting hostname check */
-
-# if EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
-# ifndef X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS
-# define X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS 0
-# endif
-# ifndef X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS
-# define X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS 0
-# endif
{
+
+#if EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
+# ifndef X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS
+# define X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS 0
+# endif
+# ifndef X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS
+# define X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS 0
+# endif
int sep = 0;
const uschar * list = verify_cert_hostnames;
uschar * name;
@@ -391,52 +405,33 @@ else
break;
}
if (!name)
- {
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
- "[%s] SSL verify error: certificate name mismatch: \"%s\"",
- tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
- txt);
- *calledp = TRUE;
- if (!*optionalp)
- return 0; /* reject */
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
- "tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
- }
- }
-# else
+#else
if (!tls_is_name_for_cert(verify_cert_hostnames, cert))
+#endif
{
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
"[%s] SSL verify error: certificate name mismatch: \"%s\"",
tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
- txt);
+ dn);
*calledp = TRUE;
if (!*optionalp)
- return 0; /* reject */
+ {
+ if (!tlsp->peercert)
+ tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert); /* record failing cert */
+ return 0; /* reject */
+ }
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
"tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
}
-# endif
+ }
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
- ev = tlsp == &tls_out ? client_static_cbinfo->event_action : event_action;
- if (ev)
- if ((yield = event_raise(ev, US"tls:cert", US"0")))
- {
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify denied by event-action: "
- "depth=0 cert=%s: %s",
- tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
- txt, yield);
- *calledp = TRUE;
- if (!*optionalp)
- return 0; /* reject */
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Event-action verify failure overridden "
- "(host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
- }
+ if (verify_event(tlsp, cert, depth, dn, calledp, optionalp, US"SSL"))
+ return 0; /* reject, with peercert set */
#endif
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL%s verify ok: depth=0 SN=%s\n",
- *calledp ? "" : " authenticated", txt);
+ *calledp ? "" : " authenticated", dn);
if (!*calledp) tlsp->certificate_verified = TRUE;
*calledp = TRUE;
}
@@ -466,36 +461,22 @@ static int
verify_callback_client_dane(int state, X509_STORE_CTX * x509ctx)
{
X509 * cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509ctx);
-static uschar txt[256];
+uschar dn[256];
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
int depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx);
uschar * yield;
+BOOL dummy_called, optional = FALSE;
#endif
-X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS txt, sizeof(txt));
-txt[sizeof(txt)-1] = '\0';
+X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS dn, sizeof(dn));
+dn[sizeof(dn)-1] = '\0';
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify_callback_client_dane: %s\n", txt);
-tls_out.peerdn = txt;
-tls_out.peercert = X509_dup(cert);
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify_callback_client_dane: %s\n", dn);
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
- if (client_static_cbinfo->event_action)
- {
- if ((yield = event_raise(client_static_cbinfo->event_action,
- US"tls:cert", string_sprintf("%d", depth))))
- {
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE verify denied by event-action: "
- "depth=%d cert=%s: %s", depth, txt, yield);
- tls_out.certificate_verified = FALSE;
- return 0; /* reject */
- }
- if (depth != 0)
- {
- X509_free(tls_out.peercert);
- tls_out.peercert = NULL;
- }
- }
+ if (verify_event(&tls_out, cert, depth, dn,
+ &dummy_called, &optional, US"DANE"))
+ return 0; /* reject, with peercert set */
#endif
if (state == 1)
@@ -1223,7 +1204,7 @@ if (!RAND_status())
/* Set up the information callback, which outputs if debugging is at a suitable
level. */
-SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(*ctxp, (void (*)())info_callback);
+DEBUG(D_tls) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(*ctxp, (void (*)())info_callback);
/* Automatically re-try reads/writes after renegotiation. */
(void) SSL_CTX_set_mode(*ctxp, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
@@ -1347,6 +1328,29 @@ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Cipher: %s\n", cipherbuf);
}
+static void
+peer_cert(SSL * ssl, tls_support * tlsp, uschar * peerdn, unsigned bsize)
+{
+/*XXX we might consider a list-of-certs variable for the cert chain.
+SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(SSL*). We'd need a new variable type and support
+in list-handling functions, also consider the difference between the entire
+chain and the elements sent by the peer. */
+
+/* Will have already noted peercert on a verify fail; possibly not the leaf */
+if (!tlsp->peercert)
+ tlsp->peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
+/* Beware anonymous ciphers which lead to server_cert being NULL */
+if (tlsp->peercert)
+ {
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(tlsp->peercert), CS peerdn, bsize);
+ peerdn[bsize-1] = '\0';
+ tlsp->peerdn = peerdn; /*XXX a static buffer... */
+ }
+else
+ tlsp->peerdn = NULL;
+}
+
+
@@ -1529,6 +1533,8 @@ tls_server_start(const uschar *require_ciphers)
int rc;
uschar *expciphers;
tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo;
+X509 * peercert;
+static uschar peerdn[256];
static uschar cipherbuf[256];
/* Check for previous activation */
@@ -1651,6 +1657,8 @@ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_accept was successful\n");
/* TLS has been set up. Adjust the input functions to read via TLS,
and initialize things. */
+peer_cert(server_ssl, &tls_in, peerdn, sizeof(peerdn));
+
construct_cipher_name(server_ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tls_in.bits);
tls_in.cipher = cipherbuf;
@@ -1811,9 +1819,8 @@ tls_client_start(int fd, host_item *host, address_item *addr,
{
smtp_transport_options_block * ob =
(smtp_transport_options_block *)tb->options_block;
-static uschar txt[256];
+static uschar peerdn[256];
uschar * expciphers;
-X509 * server_cert;
int rc;
static uschar cipherbuf[256];
@@ -1987,18 +1994,7 @@ if (rc <= 0)
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_connect succeeded\n");
-/* Beware anonymous ciphers which lead to server_cert being NULL */
-/*XXX server_cert is never freed... use X509_free() */
-server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate (client_ssl);
-if (server_cert)
- {
- tls_out.peerdn = US X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(server_cert),
- CS txt, sizeof(txt));
- txt[sizeof(txt)-1] = '\0';
- tls_out.peerdn = txt; /*XXX a static buffer... */
- }
-else
- tls_out.peerdn = NULL;
+peer_cert(client_ssl, &tls_out, peerdn, sizeof(peerdn));
construct_cipher_name(client_ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tls_out.bits);
tls_out.cipher = cipherbuf;
diff --git a/src/src/verify.c b/src/src/verify.c
index d39e103..ec75ce5 100644
--- a/src/src/verify.c
+++ b/src/src/verify.c
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ can do it there for the non-rcpt-verify case. For this we keep an addresscount.
outblock.authenticating = FALSE;
/* Reset the parameters of a TLS session */
- tls_out.cipher = tls_out.peerdn = NULL;
+ tls_out.cipher = tls_out.peerdn = tls_out.peercert = NULL;
/* Connect to the host; on failure, just loop for the next one, but we
set the error for the last one. Use the callout_connect timeout. */
diff --git a/test/confs/2114 b/test/confs/2114
index d652c06..a2b1c52 100644
--- a/test/confs/2114
+++ b/test/confs/2114
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ tls_crl = CRL
begin acl
check_recipient:
- deny message = certificate not verified: peerdn=$tls_peerdn
+ deny message = certificate not verified: peerdn=$tls_in_peerdn
! verify = certificate
accept
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ begin transports
local_delivery:
driver = appendfile
file = DIR/test-mail/$local_part
- headers_add = TLS: cipher=$tls_cipher peerdn=$tls_peerdn
+ headers_add = TLS: cipher=$tls_cipher peerdn=$tls_in_peerdn
user = CALLER
# End
