Re: [exim-dev] DANE work

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Autor: Viktor Dukhovni
Data:  
A: exim-dev
Assumpte: Re: [exim-dev] DANE work
On Wed, Sep 03, 2014 at 12:27:16AM +0000, Phil Pennock wrote:

> My jaw dropped when I returned to my list index view and saw just how
> many patches came in from work this weekend by Todd and Jeremy to
> implement DANE in Exim.
>
> Seriously good work which makes me very happy and feeling that I owe
> drinks to you both. Thank you for picking up where I totally slacked
> off and working on implementing this. (Thank you for removing one of my
> guilt layers of "I need to find time to work on X too").


Yes, thanks a bunch. I have a few questions about the code.
Specifically:

    verify_callback_client_dane(),    (lines 469--471)
    tlsa_lookup(),            (lines 1691--1713)
    dane_tlsa_load(),            (all lines)


    transports/smtp.c:            (lines 3297--3306,
                     tempfail_try_clear logic)


Since I only read the commit diff, I am missing some context,
so please pardon my ignorance... I don't know where the logic
is that tracks the DNSSEC status of the MX lookup to determine
whether the subsequent per MX-host lookups can be considered
secure.

I am not sure that DNS lookup errors are handled correctly. I
could not find code that distinguishes between lookups failure and
NXDOMAIN (which is not a lookup error).

I don't at first glance see code that enforces STARTTLS, without
authentication, when a secure TLSA RRset exists, but all records
are "unusable". I did not find any code to coerce PKIX-EE(1)
and PKIX-TA(0) to unusable.

I did notice that unsupported matching types seem to be needlessly
treated as errors, rather than as an unusable record among possibly
usable other records.

I am confused by the interaction with "tempfail try clear".

The DANE-specific verify callback seems to assume that any call in
which the verification status is OK is sufficient to make the peer's
chain valid, but that need not be the case when the chain length
is greater than 1. It may be best to not infer any final status
in that callback, and check the verification state after the
connection completes, sending a "QUIT" (to the MiTM perhaps)
and gracefully closing the connection if verification failed.

-- 
    Viktor.