Hello,
lintian warned me about
I: exim4-base: spelling-error-in-manpage usr/share/man/man8/exim.8.gz writeable writable
Assuming this really is an error (and not british vs american
english) find attached a trivial patch to change all occurences of
writeable to writable.
cu andreas
--
`What a good friend you are to him, Dr. Maturin. His other friends are
so grateful to you.'
`I sew his ears on from time to time, sure'
diff --git a/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt b/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt
index c4c181e..e2b203b 100644
--- a/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt
+++ b/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt
@@ -3428,7 +3428,7 @@ file contains a list of full pathnames, one per line, for configuration files
which are trusted. Root privilege is retained for any configuration file so
listed, as long as the caller is the Exim user (or the user specified in the
CONFIGURE_OWNER option, if any), and as long as the configuration file is
-not writeable by inappropriate users or groups.
+not writable by inappropriate users or groups.
Leaving TRUSTED_CONFIG_LIST unset precludes the possibility of testing a
configuration using &%-C%& right through message reception and delivery,
@@ -4599,7 +4599,7 @@ existing file in the list.
.cindex "ownership" "configuration file"
The run time configuration file must be owned by root or by the user that is
specified at compile time by the CONFIGURE_OWNER option (if set). The
-configuration file must not be world-writeable, or group-writeable unless its
+configuration file must not be world-writable, or group-writable unless its
group is the root group or the one specified at compile time by the
CONFIGURE_GROUP option.
@@ -4610,7 +4610,7 @@ CONFIGURE_OWNER or CONFIGURE_GROUP options, then that user and/or any users
who are members of that group will trivially be able to obtain root privileges.
Up to Exim version 4.72, the run time configuration file was also permitted to
-be writeable by the Exim user and/or group. That has been changed in Exim 4.73
+be writable by the Exim user and/or group. That has been changed in Exim 4.73
since it offered a simple privilege escalation for any attacker who managed to
compromise the Exim user account.
@@ -34258,8 +34258,8 @@ Generate verbose output.
If none of &%-fcntl%&, &%-flock%&, &%-lockfile%& or &%-mbx%& are given, the
default is to create a lock file and also to use &[fcntl()]& locking on the
mailbox, which is the same as Exim's default. The use of &%-flock%& or
-&%-fcntl%& requires that the file be writeable; the use of &%-lockfile%&
-requires that the directory containing the file be writeable. Locking by lock
+&%-fcntl%& requires that the file be writable; the use of &%-lockfile%&
+requires that the directory containing the file be writable. Locking by lock
file does not last for ever; Exim assumes that a lock file is expired if it is
more than 30 minutes old.
@@ -34886,7 +34886,7 @@ Unless the local user mailboxes are all owned by the Exim user (possible in
some POP3 or IMAP-only environments):
.olist
-They must be owned by the Exim group and be writeable by that group. This
+They must be owned by the Exim group and be writable by that group. This
implies you must set &%mode%& in the appendfile configuration, as well as the
mode of the mailbox files themselves.
.next
diff --git a/doc/doc-misc/Ext-mbx-locking b/doc/doc-misc/Ext-mbx-locking
index f1b0523..8e4c311 100644
--- a/doc/doc-misc/Ext-mbx-locking
+++ b/doc/doc-misc/Ext-mbx-locking
@@ -33,13 +33,13 @@ multi-threaded applications such as operating system kernels. It
makes several presumptions:
(1) it is alright to keep testing the lock (no overflow)
(2) the critical resource is single-access only
- (3) there is shared writeable memory between the two threads
+ (3) there is shared writable memory between the two threads
(4) the threads can be trusted to release the lock when finished
In applications programming on multi-user systems, most commonly
the other threads are in an entirely different process, which may even
be logged in as a different user. Few operating systems offer shared
-writeable memory between such processes.
+writable memory between such processes.
A means of communicating this is by use of a file with a mutually
agreed upon name. A binary semaphore can be passed by means of the
diff --git a/doc/doc-src/FAQ.src b/doc/doc-src/FAQ.src
index 03360be..6dd2886 100644
--- a/doc/doc-src/FAQ.src
+++ b/doc/doc-src/FAQ.src
@@ -1158,7 +1158,7 @@ A0065: When Exim is called with -C, it passes on -C to any instances of itself
option. This defines a file containing a list of 'trusted' prefixes for
configuration files. Any configuration file specified with -C, if it
matches a prefix listed in that file, will be used without dropping root
- privileges (as long as it is not writeable by a non-root user).
+ privileges (as long as it is not writable by a non-root user).
Q0066: What does the message \*unable to set gid=xxx or uid=xxx*\ mean?
@@ -3948,7 +3948,7 @@ A0621: Exim's default configuration is set up like this:
Q0622: Can I write an ordinary file when I run a perl script as a transport
filter for the \%remote_smtp%\ and \%address_pipe%\ transports?
-A0622: Yes, provided the file is writeable by the uid under which the transport
+A0622: Yes, provided the file is writable by the uid under which the transport
runs (the Exim user in the case of the remote transport). However, if two
messages are being delivered at once, their data will get mixed up in
the file unless you implement your own locking scheme. If all you want
diff --git a/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog b/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog
index 08fd2ef..f89dc28 100644
--- a/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog
+++ b/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ DW/21 Added Valgrind hooks in store.c to help it capture out-of-bounds store
DW/22 Bugzilla 1044: CVE-2010-4345 - partial fix: restrict default behaviour
of CONFIGURE_OWNER and CONFIGURE_GROUP options to no longer allow a
- configuration file which is writeable by the Exim user or group.
+ configuration file which is writable by the Exim user or group.
DW/23 Bugzilla 1044: CVE-2010-4345 - part two: extend checks for writeability
of configuration files to cover files specified with the -C option if
@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ PH/42 The content-scanning code uses fopen() to create files in which to put
message data. Previously it was not paying any attention to the mode of
the files. Exim runs with umask(0) because the rest of the code creates
files with open(), and sets the required mode explicitly. Thus, these
- files were ending up world-writeable. This was not a big issue, because,
+ files were ending up world-writable. This was not a big issue, because,
being within the spool directory, they were not world-accessible. I have
created a function called modefopen, which takes an additional mode
argument. It sets umask(777), creates the file, chmods it to the required
diff --git a/src/README.UPDATING b/src/README.UPDATING
index 7ce35df..7a2f39a 100644
--- a/src/README.UPDATING
+++ b/src/README.UPDATING
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ Exim version 4.73
* Exim will no longer accept a configuration file owned by the Exim
run-time user, unless that account is explicitly the value in
CONFIGURE_OWNER, which we discourage. Exim now checks to ensure that
- files are not writeable by other accounts.
+ files are not writable by other accounts.
* The ALT_CONFIG_ROOT_ONLY build option is no longer optional and is forced
on; the Exim user can, by default, no longer use -C/-D and retain privilege.
diff --git a/src/src/EDITME b/src/src/EDITME
index 941a42e..58ed484 100644
--- a/src/src/EDITME
+++ b/src/src/EDITME
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ FIXED_NEVER_USERS=root
# CONFIGURE_OWNER=
-# If the configuration file is group-writeable, Exim insists by default that it
+# If the configuration file is group-writable, Exim insists by default that it
# is owned by root. You can specify one additional permitted group owner here.
# CONFIGURE_GROUP=
diff --git a/src/src/exim.c b/src/src/exim.c
index 720d228..abe4f18 100644
--- a/src/src/exim.c
+++ b/src/src/exim.c
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ if (exim_tvcmp(&now_tv, then_tv) <= 0)
/* Exim runs with umask(0) so that files created with open() have the mode that
is specified in the open() call. However, there are some files, typically in
-the spool directory, that are created with fopen(). They end up world-writeable
+the spool directory, that are created with fopen(). They end up world-writable
if no precautions are taken. Although the spool directory is not accessible to
the world, this is an untidiness. So this is a wrapper function for fopen()
that sorts out the mode of the created file.
@@ -1615,7 +1615,7 @@ message_id[0] = 0;
/* Set the umask to zero so that any files Exim creates using open() are
created with the modes that it specifies. NOTE: Files created with fopen() have
a problem, which was not recognized till rather late (February 2006). With this
-umask, such files will be world writeable. (They are all content scanning files
+umask, such files will be world writable. (They are all content scanning files
in the spool directory, which isn't world-accessible, so this is not a
disaster, but it's untidy.) I don't want to change this overall setting,
however, because it will interact badly with the open() calls. Instead, there's
@@ -2138,9 +2138,9 @@ for (i = 1; i < argc; i++)
#ifdef CONFIGURE_GROUP
&& statbuf.st_gid != config_gid /* group not the special one */
#endif
- && (statbuf.st_mode & 020) != 0 /* group writeable */
+ && (statbuf.st_mode & 020) != 0 /* group writable */
) || /* or */
- (statbuf.st_mode & 2) != 0) /* world writeable */
+ (statbuf.st_mode & 2) != 0) /* world writable */
{
trusted_config = FALSE;
fclose(trust_list);
@@ -2386,7 +2386,7 @@ for (i = 1; i < argc; i++)
}
if (*argrest == 0)
{
- sender_address = string_sprintf(""); /* Ensure writeable memory */
+ sender_address = string_sprintf(""); /* Ensure writable memory */
}
else
{
diff --git a/src/src/readconf.c b/src/src/readconf.c
index 7e34788..331a4de 100644
--- a/src/src/readconf.c
+++ b/src/src/readconf.c
@@ -2781,7 +2781,7 @@ it reaches the end of the configuration section. The file is then left open so
that the remaining configuration data can subsequently be read if needed for
this run of Exim.
-The configuration file must be owned either by root or exim, and be writeable
+The configuration file must be owned either by root or exim, and be writable
only by root or uid/gid exim. The values for Exim's uid and gid can be changed
in the config file, so the test is done on the compiled in values. A slight
anomaly, to be carefully documented.
@@ -2902,9 +2902,9 @@ if (trusted_config && Ustrcmp(filename, US"/dev/null"))
#ifdef CONFIGURE_GROUP
&& statbuf.st_gid != config_gid /* group not the special one */
#endif
- && (statbuf.st_mode & 020) != 0) || /* group writeable */
+ && (statbuf.st_mode & 020) != 0) || /* group writable */
/* or */
- ((statbuf.st_mode & 2) != 0)) /* world writeable */
+ ((statbuf.st_mode & 2) != 0)) /* world writable */
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "Exim configuration file %s has the "
"wrong owner, group, or mode", big_buffer);
diff --git a/src/src/verify.c b/src/src/verify.c
index 475f52d..8e29af7 100644
--- a/src/src/verify.c
+++ b/src/src/verify.c
@@ -972,7 +972,7 @@ uschar **failure_ptr = is_recipient?
uschar *ko_prefix, *cr;
uschar *address = vaddr->address;
uschar *save_sender;
-uschar null_sender[] = { 0 }; /* Ensure writeable memory */
+uschar null_sender[] = { 0 }; /* Ensure writable memory */
/* Clear, just in case */
