[exim-cvs] OCSP Stapling support, under EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP.

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Autor: Exim Git Commits Mailing List
Datum:  
To: exim-cvs
Betreff: [exim-cvs] OCSP Stapling support, under EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP.
Gitweb: http://git.exim.org/exim.git/commitdiff/3f7eeb86e15557a030b86e90d62708e96d68c023
Commit:     3f7eeb86e15557a030b86e90d62708e96d68c023
Parent:     5b4569757c6dc749c250f065705f65c938bffb2e
Author:     Phil Pennock <pdp@???>
AuthorDate: Tue May 8 08:20:33 2012 -0700
Committer:  Phil Pennock <pdp@???>
CommitDate: Tue May 8 08:20:33 2012 -0700


    OCSP Stapling support, under EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP.


    OpenSSL only.
---
 doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog             |    2 +
 doc/doc-txt/NewStuff              |    8 +
 doc/doc-txt/experimental-spec.txt |   59 +++++++++
 src/src/EDITME                    |    5 +
 src/src/config.h.defaults         |    5 +-
 src/src/globals.c                 |    3 +
 src/src/globals.h                 |    3 +
 src/src/readconf.c                |    3 +
 src/src/tls-openssl.c             |  259 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 9 files changed, 333 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)


diff --git a/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog b/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog
index d202cf1..7c6ce24 100644
--- a/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog
+++ b/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog
@@ -91,6 +91,8 @@ PP/20 Revert part of NM/04, it broke log_path containing %D expansions.

PP/21 Defaulting "accept_8bitmime" to true, not false.

+PP/22 Added EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP for OpenSSL.
+

 Exim version 4.77
 -----------------
diff --git a/doc/doc-txt/NewStuff b/doc/doc-txt/NewStuff
index 1c81905..96839cd 100644
--- a/doc/doc-txt/NewStuff
+++ b/doc/doc-txt/NewStuff
@@ -62,6 +62,14 @@ Version 4.78
     Those who disagree, or know that they are talking to mail servers that,
     even today, are not 8-bit clean, need to turn off this option.


+ 9. With OpenSSL, if built with EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP, a new option tls_ocsp_file
+    is now available.  If the contents of the file are valid, then Exim will
+    send that back in response to a TLS status request; this is OCSP Stapling.
+    Exim will not maintain the contents of the file in any way: administrators
+    are responsible for ensuring that it is up-to-date.
+
+    See "experimental-spec.txt" for more details.
+


Version 4.77
------------
diff --git a/doc/doc-txt/experimental-spec.txt b/doc/doc-txt/experimental-spec.txt
index 1d290c2..0073b07 100644
--- a/doc/doc-txt/experimental-spec.txt
+++ b/doc/doc-txt/experimental-spec.txt
@@ -6,6 +6,65 @@ about experimenatal features, all of which are unstable and
liable to incompatibile change.


+OCSP Stapling support
+--------------------------------------------------------------
+
+X509 PKI certificates expire and can be revoked; to handle this, the
+clients need some way to determine if a particular certificate, from a
+particular Certificate Authority (CA), is still valid. There are three
+main ways to do so.
+
+The simplest way is to serve up a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) with
+an ordinary web-server, regenerating the CRL before it expires. The
+downside is that clients have to periodically re-download a potentially
+huge file from every certificate authority it knows of.
+
+The way with most moving parts at query time is Online Certificate
+Status Protocol (OCSP), where the client verifies the certificate
+against an OCSP server run by the CA. This lets the CA track all
+usage of the certs. This requires running software with access to the
+private key of the CA, to sign the responses to the OCSP queries. OCSP
+is based on HTTP and can be proxied accordingly.
+
+The only widespread OCSP server implementation (known to this writer)
+comes as part of OpenSSL and aborts on an invalid request, such as
+connecting to the port and then disconnecting. This requires
+re-entering the passphrase each time some random client does this.
+
+The third way is OCSP Stapling; in this, the server using a certificate
+issued by the CA periodically requests an OCSP proof of validity from
+the OCSP server, then serves it up inline as part of the TLS
+negotiation. This approach adds no extra round trips, does not let the
+CA track users, scales well with number of certs issued by the CA and is
+resilient to temporary OCSP server failures, as long as the server
+starts retrying to fetch an OCSP proof some time before its current
+proof expires. The downside is that it requires server support.
+
+If Exim is built with EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP and it was built with OpenSSL,
+then it gains one new option: "tls_ocsp_file".
+
+The file specified therein is expected to be in DER format, and contain
+an OCSP proof. Exim will serve it as part of the TLS handshake. This
+option will be re-expanded for SNI, if the tls_certificate option
+contains $tls_sni, as per other TLS options.
+
+Exim does not at this time implement any support for fetching a new OCSP
+proof. The burden is on the administrator to handle this, outside of
+Exim. The file specified should be replaced atomically, so that the
+contents are always valid. Exim will expand the "tls_ocsp_file" option
+on each connection, so a new file will be handled transparently on the
+next connection.
+
+Exim will check for a validity next update timestamp in the OCSP proof;
+if not present, or if the proof has expired, it will be ignored.
+
+At this point in time, we're gathering feedback on use, to determine if
+it's worth adding complexity to the Exim daemon to periodically re-fetch
+OCSP files and somehow handling multiple files.
+
+
+
+
Brightmail AntiSpam (BMI) suppport
--------------------------------------------------------------

diff --git a/src/src/EDITME b/src/src/EDITME
index f247f44..f4e788a 100644
--- a/src/src/EDITME
+++ b/src/src/EDITME
@@ -439,6 +439,11 @@ EXIM_MONITOR=eximon.bin
# CFLAGS += -I/opt/brightmail/bsdk-6.0/include
# LDFLAGS += -lxml2_single -lbmiclient_single -L/opt/brightmail/bsdk-6.0/lib

+# Uncomment the following line to add OCSP stapling support in TLS, if Exim
+# was built using OpenSSL.
+
+# EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP=yes
+


###############################################################################
diff --git a/src/src/config.h.defaults b/src/src/config.h.defaults
index c082b92..a5e12d2 100644
--- a/src/src/config.h.defaults
+++ b/src/src/config.h.defaults
@@ -158,10 +158,11 @@ it's a default value. */
#define WITH_OLD_CLAMAV_STREAM

/* EXPERIMENTAL features */
-#define EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
-#define EXPERIMENTAL_SRS
#define EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
#define EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
+#define EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
+#define EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
+#define EXPERIMENTAL_SRS

 /* Things that are not routinely changed but are nevertheless configurable
 just in case. */
diff --git a/src/src/globals.c b/src/src/globals.c
index af0c14b..5ea4329 100644
--- a/src/src/globals.c
+++ b/src/src/globals.c
@@ -112,6 +112,9 @@ uschar *tls_advertise_hosts    = NULL;    /* This is deliberate */
 uschar *tls_certificate        = NULL;
 uschar *tls_crl                = NULL;
 uschar *tls_dhparam            = NULL;
+#if defined(EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP) && !defined(USE_GNUTLS)
+uschar *tls_ocsp_file          = NULL;
+#endif
 BOOL    tls_offered            = FALSE;
 uschar *tls_privatekey         = NULL;
 BOOL    tls_remember_esmtp     = FALSE;
diff --git a/src/src/globals.h b/src/src/globals.h
index f954078..ec19d0a 100644
--- a/src/src/globals.h
+++ b/src/src/globals.h
@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ extern uschar *tls_certificate;        /* Certificate file */
 extern uschar *tls_channelbinding_b64; /* string of base64 channel binding */
 extern uschar *tls_crl;                /* CRL File */
 extern uschar *tls_dhparam;            /* DH param file */
+#if defined(EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP) && !defined(USE_GNUTLS)
+extern uschar *tls_ocsp_file;          /* OCSP stapling proof file */
+#endif
 extern BOOL    tls_offered;            /* Server offered TLS */
 extern uschar *tls_privatekey;         /* Private key file */
 extern BOOL    tls_remember_esmtp;     /* For YAEB */
diff --git a/src/src/readconf.c b/src/src/readconf.c
index b35811e..badb6a2 100644
--- a/src/src/readconf.c
+++ b/src/src/readconf.c
@@ -415,6 +415,9 @@ static optionlist optionlist_config[] = {
   { "tls_certificate",          opt_stringptr,   &tls_certificate },
   { "tls_crl",                  opt_stringptr,   &tls_crl },
   { "tls_dhparam",              opt_stringptr,   &tls_dhparam },
+#if defined(EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP) && !defined(USE_GNUTLS)
+  { "tls_ocsp_file",            opt_stringptr,   &tls_ocsp_file },
+#endif
   { "tls_on_connect_ports",     opt_stringptr,   &tls_on_connect_ports },
   { "tls_privatekey",           opt_stringptr,   &tls_privatekey },
   { "tls_remember_esmtp",       opt_bool,        &tls_remember_esmtp },
diff --git a/src/src/tls-openssl.c b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
index e609670..9ead794 100644
--- a/src/src/tls-openssl.c
+++ b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
@@ -20,6 +20,14 @@ functions from the OpenSSL library. */
 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
+#define EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS (300L)
+#define EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE (-1L)
+#endif


/* Structure for collecting random data for seeding. */

@@ -48,6 +56,11 @@ static BOOL    reexpand_tls_files_for_sni = FALSE;
 typedef struct tls_ext_ctx_cb {
   uschar *certificate;
   uschar *privatekey;
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
+  uschar *ocsp_file;
+  uschar *ocsp_file_expanded;
+  OCSP_RESPONSE *ocsp_response;
+#endif
   uschar *dhparam;
   /* these are cached from first expand */
   uschar *server_cipher_list;
@@ -63,6 +76,12 @@ tls_ext_ctx_cb *static_cbinfo = NULL;
 static int
 setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional);


+/* Callbacks */
+static int tls_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad ARG_UNUSED, void *arg);
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
+static int tls_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg);
+#endif
+

 /*************************************************
 *               Handle TLS error                 *
@@ -298,6 +317,131 @@ return yield;




+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
+/*************************************************
+*       Load OCSP information into state         *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Called to load the OCSP response from the given file into memory, once
+caller has determined this is needed.  Checks validity.  Debugs a message
+if invalid.
+
+ASSUMES: single response, for single cert.
+
+Arguments:
+  sctx            the SSL_CTX* to update
+  cbinfo          various parts of session state
+  expanded        the filename putatively holding an OCSP response
+
+*/
+
+static void
+ocsp_load_response(SSL_CTX *sctx,
+    tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo,
+    const uschar *expanded)
+{
+BIO *bio;
+OCSP_RESPONSE *resp;
+OCSP_BASICRESP *basic_response;
+OCSP_SINGLERESP *single_response;
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
+X509_STORE *store;
+unsigned long verify_flags;
+int status, reason, i;
+
+cbinfo->ocsp_file_expanded = string_copy(expanded);
+if (cbinfo->ocsp_response)
+  {
+  OCSP_RESPONSE_free(cbinfo->ocsp_response);
+  cbinfo->ocsp_response = NULL;
+  }
+
+bio = BIO_new_file(CS cbinfo->ocsp_file_expanded, "rb");
+if (!bio)
+  {
+  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to open OCSP response file \"%s\"\n",
+      cbinfo->ocsp_file_expanded);
+  return;
+  }
+
+resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(bio, NULL);
+BIO_free(bio);
+if (!resp)
+  {
+  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Error reading OCSP response.\n");
+  return;
+  }
+
+status = OCSP_response_status(resp);
+if (status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL)
+  {
+  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response not valid: %s (%d)\n",
+      OCSP_response_status_str(status), status);
+  return;
+  }
+
+basic_response = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp);
+if (!basic_response)
+  {
+  DEBUG(D_tls)
+    debug_printf("OCSP response parse error: unable to extract basic response.\n");
+  return;
+  }
+
+store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(sctx);
+verify_flags = OCSP_NOVERIFY; /* check sigs, but not purpose */
+
+/* May need to expose ability to adjust those flags?
+OCSP_NOSIGS OCSP_NOVERIFY OCSP_NOCHAIN OCSP_NOCHECKS OCSP_NOEXPLICIT
+OCSP_TRUSTOTHER OCSP_NOINTERN */
+
+i = OCSP_basic_verify(basic_response, NULL, store, verify_flags);
+if (i <= 0)
+  {
+  DEBUG(D_tls) {
+    ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
+    debug_printf("OCSP response verify failure: %s\n", US ssl_errstring);
+  }
+  return;
+  }
+
+/* Here's the simplifying assumption: there's only one response, for the
+one certificate we use, and nothing for anything else in a chain.  If this
+proves false, we need to extract a cert id from our issued cert
+(tls_certificate) and use that for OCSP_resp_find_status() (which finds the
+right cert in the stack and then calls OCSP_single_get0_status()).
+
+I'm hoping to avoid reworking a bunch more of how we handle state here. */
+single_response = OCSP_resp_get0(basic_response, 0);
+if (!single_response)
+  {
+  DEBUG(D_tls)
+    debug_printf("Unable to get first response from OCSP basic response.\n");
+  return;
+  }
+
+status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single_response, &reason, &rev, &thisupd, &nextupd);
+/* how does this status differ from the one above? */
+if (status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL)
+  {
+  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response not valid (take 2): %s (%d)\n",
+      OCSP_response_status_str(status), status);
+  return;
+  }
+
+if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
+  {
+  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP status invalid times.\n");
+  return;
+  }
+
+cbinfo->ocsp_response = resp;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+
+
 /*************************************************
 *        Expand key and cert file specs          *
 *************************************************/
@@ -314,7 +458,7 @@ Returns:          OK/DEFER/FAIL
 */


static int
-tls_expand_session_files(SSL_CTX *sctx, const tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo)
+tls_expand_session_files(SSL_CTX *sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo)
{
uschar *expanded;

@@ -352,6 +496,27 @@ if (expanded != NULL && *expanded != 0)
       "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file file=%s", expanded), cbinfo->host, NULL);
   }


+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
+if (cbinfo->ocsp_file != NULL)
+  {
+  if (!expand_check(cbinfo->ocsp_file, US"tls_ocsp_file", &expanded))
+    return DEFER;
+
+  if (expanded != NULL && *expanded != 0)
+    {
+    DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file %s\n", expanded);
+    if (cbinfo->ocsp_file_expanded &&
+        (Ustrcmp(expanded, cbinfo->ocsp_file_expanded) == 0))
+      {
+      DEBUG(D_tls)
+        debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file value unchanged, using existing values.\n");
+      } else {
+        ocsp_load_response(sctx, cbinfo, expanded);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+#endif
+
 return OK;
 }


@@ -376,14 +541,10 @@ Returns:          SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_{OK,ALERT_WARNING,ALERT_FATAL,NOACK}
 */


static int
-tls_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad ARG_UNUSED, void *arg);
-/* pre-declared for SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback call within func */
-
-static int
tls_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad ARG_UNUSED, void *arg)
{
const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
-const tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg;
+tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg;
int rc;
int old_pool = store_pool;

@@ -424,11 +585,20 @@ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx_sni, tls_servername_cb);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx_sni, cbinfo);
if (cbinfo->server_cipher_list)
SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx_sni, CS cbinfo->server_cipher_list);
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
+if (cbinfo->ocsp_file)
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx_sni, tls_stapling_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, cbinfo);
+ }
+#endif

-rc = tls_expand_session_files(ctx_sni, cbinfo);
+rc = setup_certs(ctx_sni, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE);
if (rc != OK) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;

-rc = setup_certs(ctx_sni, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE);
+/* do this after setup_certs, because this can require the certs for verifying
+OCSP information. */
+rc = tls_expand_session_files(ctx_sni, cbinfo);
if (rc != OK) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;

DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Switching SSL context.\n");
@@ -440,6 +610,45 @@ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;



+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
+/*************************************************
+*        Callback to handle OCSP Stapling        *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Called when acting as server during the TLS session setup if the client
+requests OCSP information with a Certificate Status Request.
+
+Documentation via openssl s_server.c and the Apache patch from the OpenSSL
+project.
+
+*/
+
+static int
+tls_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+const tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg;
+uschar *response_der;
+int response_der_len;
+
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS status request (OCSP stapling); %s response.\n",
+    cbinfo->ocsp_response ? "have" : "lack");
+if (!cbinfo->ocsp_response)
+  return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+
+response_der = NULL;
+response_der_len = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(cbinfo->ocsp_response, &response_der);
+if (response_der_len <= 0)
+  return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+
+SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, response_der, response_der_len);
+return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+#endif /* EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP */
+
+
+
+
 /*************************************************
 *            Initialize for TLS                  *
 *************************************************/
@@ -459,7 +668,11 @@ Returns:          OK/DEFER/FAIL


static int
tls_init(host_item *host, uschar *dhparam, uschar *certificate,
- uschar *privatekey, address_item *addr)
+ uschar *privatekey,
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
+ uschar *ocsp_file,
+#endif
+ address_item *addr)
{
long init_options;
int rc;
@@ -469,6 +682,9 @@ tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo;
cbinfo = store_malloc(sizeof(tls_ext_ctx_cb));
cbinfo->certificate = certificate;
cbinfo->privatekey = privatekey;
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
+cbinfo->ocsp_file = ocsp_file;
+#endif
cbinfo->dhparam = dhparam;
cbinfo->host = host;

@@ -546,7 +762,7 @@ else

if (!init_dh(dhparam, host)) return DEFER;

-/* Set up certificate and key */
+/* Set up certificate and key (and perhaps OCSP info) */

 rc = tls_expand_session_files(ctx, cbinfo);
 if (rc != OK) return rc;
@@ -555,6 +771,17 @@ if (rc != OK) return rc;
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090806fL && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
 if (host == NULL)
   {
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
+  /* We check ocsp_file, not ocsp_response, because we care about if
+  the option exists, not what the current expansion might be, as SNI might
+  change the certificate and OCSP file in use between now and the time the
+  callback is invoked. */
+  if (cbinfo->ocsp_file)
+    {
+    SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, tls_stapling_cb);
+    SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, cbinfo);
+    }
+#endif
   /* We always do this, so that $tls_sni is available even if not used in
   tls_certificate */
   SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, tls_servername_cb);
@@ -811,7 +1038,11 @@ if (tls_active >= 0)
 /* Initialize the SSL library. If it fails, it will already have logged
 the error. */


-rc = tls_init(NULL, tls_dhparam, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey, NULL);
+rc = tls_init(NULL, tls_dhparam, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey,
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
+    tls_ocsp_file,
+#endif
+    NULL);
 if (rc != OK) return rc;
 cbinfo = static_cbinfo;


@@ -978,7 +1209,11 @@ uschar *expciphers;
X509* server_cert;
int rc;

-rc = tls_init(host, dhparam, certificate, privatekey, addr);
+rc = tls_init(host, dhparam, certificate, privatekey,
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
+    NULL,
+#endif
+    addr);
 if (rc != OK) return rc;


tls_certificate_verified = FALSE;