[exim-cvs] Implemented gsasl driver for authentication.

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Dla: exim-cvs
Temat: [exim-cvs] Implemented gsasl driver for authentication.
Gitweb: http://git.exim.org/exim.git/commitdiff/44bbabb570db6e700a31469a0faf2ac27bf3bfe0
Commit:     44bbabb570db6e700a31469a0faf2ac27bf3bfe0
Parent:     8ebb1c9ea93eb27500756a578640d890b53264d3
Author:     Phil Pennock <pdp@???>
AuthorDate: Sun Feb 5 19:13:32 2012 -0500
Committer:  Phil Pennock <pdp@???>
CommitDate: Sun Feb 5 19:13:32 2012 -0500


    Implemented gsasl driver for authentication.


    Missing: documentation; tests.


    Tested: PLAIN auth.


    Status: probably buggy
---
 src/scripts/MakeLinks           |    2 +
 src/src/EDITME                  |    4 +-
 src/src/auths/Makefile          |    4 +-
 src/src/auths/check_serv_cond.c |   43 +++-
 src/src/auths/cyrus_sasl.c      |    2 +-
 src/src/auths/cyrus_sasl.h      |    1 +
 src/src/auths/get_no64_data.c   |    4 +-
 src/src/auths/gsasl_exim.c      |  587 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 src/src/auths/gsasl_exim.h      |   42 +++
 src/src/config.h.defaults       |    1 +
 src/src/drtables.c              |   35 ++-
 src/src/exim.c                  |   13 +-
 src/src/exim.h                  |    8 -
 src/src/functions.h             |    2 +
 src/src/globals.h               |    5 +
 src/src/structs.h               |    2 +
 src/src/tls-gnu.c               |   20 ++-
 src/src/tls.c                   |    1 +
 18 files changed, 748 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)


diff --git a/src/scripts/MakeLinks b/src/scripts/MakeLinks
index 082659c..f7d0003 100755
--- a/src/scripts/MakeLinks
+++ b/src/scripts/MakeLinks
@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ ln -s ../../src/auths/call_radius.c      call_radius.c
 ln -s ../../src/auths/check_serv_cond.c  check_serv_cond.c
 ln -s ../../src/auths/cyrus_sasl.c       cyrus_sasl.c
 ln -s ../../src/auths/cyrus_sasl.h       cyrus_sasl.h
+ln -s ../../src/auths/gsasl_exim.c       gsasl_exim.c
+ln -s ../../src/auths/gsasl_exim.h       gsasl_exim.h
 ln -s ../../src/auths/get_data.c         get_data.c
 ln -s ../../src/auths/get_no64_data.c    get_no64_data.c
 ln -s ../../src/auths/md5.c              md5.c
diff --git a/src/src/EDITME b/src/src/EDITME
index a180cd5..7e426ea 100644
--- a/src/src/EDITME
+++ b/src/src/EDITME
@@ -553,6 +553,7 @@ FIXED_NEVER_USERS=root
 # AUTH_CRAM_MD5=yes
 # AUTH_CYRUS_SASL=yes
 # AUTH_DOVECOT=yes
+# AUTH_GSASL=yes
 # AUTH_PLAINTEXT=yes
 # AUTH_SPA=yes


@@ -560,9 +561,10 @@ FIXED_NEVER_USERS=root
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# If you specified AUTH_CYRUS_SASL above, you should ensure that you have the
# Cyrus SASL library installed before trying to build Exim, and you probably
-# want to uncomment the following line:
+# want to uncomment the first line below. Similarly for GNU SASL.

# AUTH_LIBS=-lsasl2
+# AUTH_LIBS=-lgsasl


#------------------------------------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/src/src/auths/Makefile b/src/src/auths/Makefile
index 3e0e1a2..1354c8c 100644
--- a/src/src/auths/Makefile
+++ b/src/src/auths/Makefile
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@

 OBJ = auth-spa.o b64decode.o b64encode.o call_pam.o call_pwcheck.o \
       call_radius.o check_serv_cond.o cram_md5.o cyrus_sasl.o dovecot.o \
-      get_data.o get_no64_data.o md5.o plaintext.o pwcheck.o sha1.o \
+      get_data.o get_no64_data.o gsasl_exim.o \
+      md5.o plaintext.o pwcheck.o sha1.o \
       spa.o xtextdecode.o xtextencode.o


 auths.a:         $(OBJ)
@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ xtextencode.o:      $(HDRS) xtextencode.c
 cram_md5.o:         $(HDRS) cram_md5.c cram_md5.h
 cyrus_sasl.o:       $(HDRS) cyrus_sasl.c cyrus_sasl.h
 dovecot.o:          $(HDRS) dovecot.c dovecot.h
+gsasl_exim.o:       $(HDRS) gsasl_exim.c gsasl_exim.h
 plaintext.o:        $(HDRS) plaintext.c plaintext.h
 spa.o:              $(HDRS) spa.c spa.h


diff --git a/src/src/auths/check_serv_cond.c b/src/src/auths/check_serv_cond.c
index 476d112..c10ff1b 100644
--- a/src/src/auths/check_serv_cond.c
+++ b/src/src/auths/check_serv_cond.c
@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ by all authenticators. */
*************************************************/

/* This function is called from the server code of all authenticators. For
-plaintext, it is always called: the argument cannot be empty, because for
-plaintext, setting server_condition is what enables it as a server
+plaintext and gsasl, it is always called: the argument cannot be empty, because
+for those, setting server_condition is what enables it as a server
authenticator. For all the other authenticators, this function is called after
they have authenticated, to enable additional authorization to be done.

@@ -32,12 +32,40 @@ Returns:
 int
 auth_check_serv_cond(auth_instance *ablock)
 {
+  return auth_check_some_cond(ablock,
+      US"server_condition", ablock->server_condition, OK);
+}
+
+
+/*************************************************
+*         Check some server condition            *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* This underlies server_condition, but is also used for some more generic
+ checks.
+
+Arguments:
+  ablock     the authenticator's instance block
+  label      debugging label naming the string checked
+  condition  the condition string to be expanded and checked
+  unset      value to return on NULL condition
+
+Returns:
+  OK          success (or unset=OK)
+  DEFER       couldn't complete the check
+  FAIL        authentication failed
+*/
+
+int
+auth_check_some_cond(auth_instance *ablock,
+    uschar *label, uschar *condition, int unset)
+{
 uschar *cond;


 HDEBUG(D_auth)
   {
   int i;
-  debug_printf("%s authenticator:\n", ablock->name);
+  debug_printf("%s authenticator %s:\n", ablock->name, label);
   for (i = 0; i < AUTH_VARS; i++)
     {
     if (auth_vars[i] != NULL)
@@ -51,8 +79,13 @@ HDEBUG(D_auth)
 /* For the plaintext authenticator, server_condition is never NULL. For the
 rest, an unset condition lets everything through. */


-if (ablock->server_condition == NULL) return OK;
-cond = expand_string(ablock->server_condition);
+/* For server_condition, an unset condition lets everything through.
+For plaintext/gsasl authenticators, it will have been pre-checked to prevent
+this. We return the unset scenario value given to us, which for
+server_condition will be OK and otherwise will typically be FAIL. */
+
+if (condition == NULL) return unset;
+cond = expand_string(condition);

HDEBUG(D_auth)
{
diff --git a/src/src/auths/cyrus_sasl.c b/src/src/auths/cyrus_sasl.c
index fea1def..df7abc9 100644
--- a/src/src/auths/cyrus_sasl.c
+++ b/src/src/auths/cyrus_sasl.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ if(ob->server_mech == NULL)
* authenticator of type whatever mechanism we're using
*/

-cbs[0].proc = &mysasl_config;
+cbs[0].proc = (int(*)(void))&mysasl_config;
cbs[0].context = ob->server_mech;

 rc=sasl_server_init(cbs, "exim");
diff --git a/src/src/auths/cyrus_sasl.h b/src/src/auths/cyrus_sasl.h
index 7e62e63..031e783 100644
--- a/src/src/auths/cyrus_sasl.h
+++ b/src/src/auths/cyrus_sasl.h
@@ -31,5 +31,6 @@ extern void auth_cyrus_sasl_init(auth_instance *);
 extern int auth_cyrus_sasl_server(auth_instance *, uschar *);
 extern int auth_cyrus_sasl_client(auth_instance *, smtp_inblock *,
                                 smtp_outblock *, int, uschar *, int);
+extern void auth_cyrus_sasl_version_report(FILE *f);


/* End of cyrus_sasl.h */
diff --git a/src/src/auths/get_no64_data.c b/src/src/auths/get_no64_data.c
index 4055c04..ea5fd6f 100644
--- a/src/src/auths/get_no64_data.c
+++ b/src/src/auths/get_no64_data.c
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@

/* This function is used by authentication drivers to output a challenge
to the SMTP client and read the response line. This version does not use base
-64 encoding for the text on the 334 line. It is used by the SPA and dovecot
-authenticators.
+64 encoding for the text on the 334 line. It is used by the SPA, dovecot
+and gsasl authenticators.

 Arguments:
    aptr       set to point to the response (which is in big_buffer)
diff --git a/src/src/auths/gsasl_exim.c b/src/src/auths/gsasl_exim.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e88bd25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/src/auths/gsasl_exim.c
@@ -0,0 +1,587 @@
+/*************************************************
+*     Exim - an Internet mail transport agent    *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2012 */
+/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
+
+/* Copyright (c) Twitter Inc 2012 */
+
+/* Interface to GNU SASL library for generic authentication. */
+
+/* Trade-offs:
+
+GNU SASL does not provide authentication data itself, so we have to expose
+that decision to configuration.  For some mechanisms, we need to act much
+like plaintext.  For others, we only need to be able to provide some
+evaluated data on demand.  There's no abstracted way (ie, without hardcoding
+knowledge of authenticators here) to know which need what properties; we
+can't query a session or the library for "we will need these for mechanism X".
+
+So: we always require server_condition, even if sometimes it will just be
+set as "yes".  We do provide a number of other hooks, which might not make
+sense in all contexts.  For some, we can do checks at init time.
+*/
+
+#include "../exim.h"
+
+#ifndef AUTH_GSASL
+/* dummy function to satisfy compilers when we link in an "empty" file. */
+static void dummy(int x) { dummy(x-1); }
+#else
+
+#include <gsasl.h>
+#include "gsasl_exim.h"
+
+/* Authenticator-specific options. */
+/* I did have server_*_condition options for various mechanisms, but since
+we only ever handle one mechanism at a time, I didn't see the point in keeping
+that.  In case someone sees a point, I've left the condition_check() API
+alone. */
+optionlist auth_gsasl_options[] = {
+  { "server_channelbinding", opt_bool,
+      (void *)(offsetof(auth_gsasl_options_block, server_channelbinding)) },
+  { "server_hostname",      opt_stringptr,
+      (void *)(offsetof(auth_gsasl_options_block, server_hostname)) },
+  { "server_mech",          opt_stringptr,
+      (void *)(offsetof(auth_gsasl_options_block, server_mech)) },
+  { "server_password",      opt_stringptr,
+      (void *)(offsetof(auth_gsasl_options_block, server_password)) },
+  { "server_realm",         opt_stringptr,
+      (void *)(offsetof(auth_gsasl_options_block, server_realm)) },
+  { "server_scram_iter",    opt_stringptr,
+      (void *)(offsetof(auth_gsasl_options_block, server_scram_iter)) },
+  { "server_scram_salt",    opt_stringptr,
+      (void *)(offsetof(auth_gsasl_options_block, server_scram_salt)) },
+  { "server_service",       opt_stringptr,
+      (void *)(offsetof(auth_gsasl_options_block, server_service)) }
+};
+/* GSASL_SCRAM_SALTED_PASSWORD documented only for client, so not implementing
+hooks to avoid cleartext passwords in the Exim server. */
+
+int auth_gsasl_options_count =
+  sizeof(auth_gsasl_options)/sizeof(optionlist);
+
+/* Defaults for the authenticator-specific options. */
+auth_gsasl_options_block auth_gsasl_option_defaults = {
+  US"smtp",                 /* server_service */
+  US"$primary_hostname",    /* server_hostname */
+  NULL,                     /* server_realm */
+  NULL,                     /* server_mech */
+  NULL,                     /* server_password */
+  NULL,                     /* server_scram_iter */
+  NULL,                     /* server_scram_salt */
+  FALSE                     /* server_channelbinding */
+};
+
+/* "Globals" for managing the gsasl interface. */
+
+static Gsasl *gsasl_ctx = NULL;
+static int
+  main_callback(Gsasl *ctx, Gsasl_session *sctx, Gsasl_property prop);
+static int
+  server_callback(Gsasl *ctx, Gsasl_session *sctx, Gsasl_property prop, auth_instance *ablock);
+static int
+  client_callback(Gsasl *ctx, Gsasl_session *sctx, Gsasl_property prop, auth_instance *ablock);
+
+static BOOL sasl_error_should_defer = FALSE;
+static Gsasl_property callback_loop = 0;
+static BOOL checked_server_condition = FALSE;
+
+enum { CURRENTLY_SERVER = 1, CURRENTLY_CLIENT = 2 };
+
+struct callback_exim_state {
+  auth_instance *ablock;
+  int currently;
+};
+
+
+/*************************************************
+*          Initialization entry point            *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Called for each instance, after its options have been read, to
+enable consistency checks to be done, or anything else that needs
+to be set up. */
+
+void
+auth_gsasl_init(auth_instance *ablock)
+{
+  char *p;
+  int rc, supported;
+  auth_gsasl_options_block *ob =
+    (auth_gsasl_options_block *)(ablock->options_block);
+
+  /* As per existing Cyrus glue, use the authenticator's public name as
+  the default for the mechanism name; we don't handle multiple mechanisms
+  in one authenticator, but the same driver can be used multiple times. */
+
+  if (ob->server_mech == NULL)
+    ob->server_mech = string_copy(ablock->public_name);
+
+  /* Can get multiple session contexts from one library context, so just
+  initialise the once. */
+  if (gsasl_ctx == NULL) {
+    rc = gsasl_init(&gsasl_ctx);
+    if (rc != GSASL_OK) {
+      log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG_FOR, "%s authenticator:  "
+                "couldn't initialise GNU SASL library: %s (%s)",
+                ablock->name, gsasl_strerror_name(rc), gsasl_strerror(rc));
+    }
+    gsasl_callback_set(gsasl_ctx, main_callback);
+  }
+
+  /* We don't need this except to log it for debugging. */
+  rc = gsasl_server_mechlist(gsasl_ctx, &p);
+  if (rc != GSASL_OK)
+    log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG_FOR, "%s authenticator:  "
+              "failed to retrieve list of mechanisms: %s (%s)",
+              ablock->name,  gsasl_strerror_name(rc), gsasl_strerror(rc));
+  HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("GNU SASL supports: %s\n", p);
+
+  supported = gsasl_client_support_p(gsasl_ctx, (const char *)ob->server_mech);
+  if (!supported)
+    log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG_FOR, "%s authenticator:  "
+              "GNU SASL does not support mechanism \"%s\"",
+              ablock->name, ob->server_mech);
+
+  if ((ablock->server_condition == NULL) &&
+      (strcmpic(ob->server_mech, US"EXTERNAL") ||
+       strcmpic(ob->server_mech, US"ANONYMOUS") ||
+       strcmpic(ob->server_mech, US"PLAIN") ||
+       strcmpic(ob->server_mech, US"LOGIN")))
+    log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG_FOR, "%s authenticator:  "
+              "Need server_condition for %s mechanism",
+              ablock->name, ob->server_mech);
+
+  /* At present, for mechanisms we don't panic on absence of server_condition;
+  need to figure out the most generically correct approach to deciding when
+  it's critical and when it isn't.  Eg, for simple validation (PLAIN mechanism,
+  etc) it clearly is critical.
+
+  So don't activate without server_condition, this might be relaxed in the future.
+  */
+  if (ablock->server_condition != NULL) ablock->server = TRUE;
+  ablock->client = FALSE;
+}
+
+
+/* GNU SASL uses one top-level callback, registered at library level.
+We dispatch to client and server functions instead. */
+
+static int
+main_callback(Gsasl *ctx, Gsasl_session *sctx, Gsasl_property prop)
+{
+  int rc = 0;
+  struct callback_exim_state *cb_state =
+    (struct callback_exim_state *)gsasl_session_hook_get(sctx);
+
+  HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("Callback entered, prop=%d (loop prop=%d)\n",
+      prop, callback_loop);
+
+  if (cb_state == NULL) {
+    HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("  not from our server/client processing.\n");
+    return GSASL_NO_CALLBACK;
+  }
+
+  if (callback_loop > 0) {
+    /* Most likely is that we were asked for property foo, and to
+    expand the string we asked for property bar to put into an auth
+    variable, but property bar is not supplied for this mechanism. */
+    HDEBUG(D_auth)
+      debug_printf("Loop, asked for property %d while handling property %d\n",
+          prop, callback_loop);
+    return GSASL_NO_CALLBACK;
+  }
+  callback_loop = prop;
+
+  if (cb_state->currently == CURRENTLY_CLIENT)
+    rc = client_callback(ctx, sctx, prop, cb_state->ablock);
+  else if (cb_state->currently == CURRENTLY_SERVER)
+    rc = server_callback(ctx, sctx, prop, cb_state->ablock);
+  else {
+    log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG_FOR, "%s authenticator:  "
+        "unhandled callback state, bug in Exim", cb_state->ablock->name);
+    /* NOTREACHED */
+  }
+
+  callback_loop = 0;
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*************************************************
+*             Server entry point                 *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* For interface, see auths/README */
+
+int
+auth_gsasl_server(auth_instance *ablock, uschar *initial_data)
+{
+  char *tmps;
+  char *to_send, *received;
+  Gsasl_session *sctx = NULL;
+  auth_gsasl_options_block *ob =
+    (auth_gsasl_options_block *)(ablock->options_block);
+  struct callback_exim_state cb_state;
+  int rc, auth_result, exim_error, exim_error_override;
+
+  HDEBUG(D_auth)
+    debug_printf("GNU SASL: initialising session for %s, mechanism %s.\n",
+        ablock->name, ob->server_mech);
+
+  rc = gsasl_server_start(gsasl_ctx, (const char *)ob->server_mech, &sctx);
+  if (rc != GSASL_OK) {
+    auth_defer_msg = string_sprintf("GNU SASL: session start failure: %s (%s)",
+        gsasl_strerror_name(rc), gsasl_strerror(rc));
+    HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("%s\n", auth_defer_msg);
+    return DEFER;
+  }
+  /* Hereafter: gsasl_finish(sctx) please */
+
+  gsasl_session_hook_set(sctx, (void *)ablock);
+  cb_state.ablock = ablock;
+  cb_state.currently = CURRENTLY_SERVER;
+  gsasl_session_hook_set(sctx, (void *)&cb_state);
+
+  tmps = CS expand_string(ob->server_service);
+  gsasl_property_set(sctx, GSASL_SERVICE, tmps);
+  tmps = CS expand_string(ob->server_hostname);
+  gsasl_property_set(sctx, GSASL_HOSTNAME, tmps);
+  if (ob->server_realm) {
+    tmps = CS expand_string(ob->server_realm);
+    if (tmps && *tmps) {
+      gsasl_property_set(sctx, GSASL_REALM, tmps);
+    }
+  }
+  /* We don't support protection layers. */
+  gsasl_property_set(sctx, GSASL_QOPS, "qop-auth");
+#ifdef SUPPORT_TLS
+  if (tls_channelbinding_b64) {
+    /* Some auth mechanisms can ensure that both sides are talking withing the
+    same security context; for TLS, this means that even if a bad certificate
+    has been accepted, they remain MitM-proof because both sides must be within
+    the same negotiated session; if someone is terminating one sesson and
+    proxying data on within a second, authentication will fail.
+
+    We might not have this available, depending upon TLS implementation,
+    ciphersuite, phase of moon ...
+
+    If we do, it results in extra SASL mechanisms being available; here,
+    Exim's one-mechanism-per-authenticator potentially causes problems.
+    It depends upon how GNU SASL will implement the PLUS variants of GS2
+    and whether it automatically mandates a switch to the bound PLUS
+    if the data is available.  Since default-on, despite being more secure,
+    would then result in mechanism name changes on a library update, we
+    have little choice but to default it off and let the admin choose to
+    enable it.  *sigh*
+    */
+    if (ob->server_channelbinding) {
+      HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("Auth %s: Enabling channel-binding\n",
+          ablock->name);
+      gsasl_property_set(sctx, GSASL_CB_TLS_UNIQUE,
+          (const char *) tls_channelbinding_b64);
+    } else {
+      HDEBUG(D_auth)
+        debug_printf("Auth %s: Not enabling channel-binding (data available)\n",
+            ablock->name);
+    }
+  } else {
+    HDEBUG(D_auth)
+      debug_printf("Auth %s: no channel-binding data available\n",
+          ablock->name);
+  }
+#endif
+
+  checked_server_condition = FALSE;
+
+  received = CS initial_data;
+  to_send = NULL;
+  exim_error = exim_error_override = OK;
+
+  do {
+    rc = gsasl_step64(sctx, received, &to_send);
+
+    switch (rc) {
+      case GSASL_OK:
+        goto STOP_INTERACTION;
+
+      case GSASL_NEEDS_MORE:
+        break;
+
+      case GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR:
+      case GSASL_INTEGRITY_ERROR:
+      case GSASL_NO_AUTHID:
+      case GSASL_NO_ANONYMOUS_TOKEN:
+      case GSASL_NO_AUTHZID:
+      case GSASL_NO_PASSWORD:
+      case GSASL_NO_PASSCODE:
+      case GSASL_NO_PIN:
+      case GSASL_BASE64_ERROR:
+        HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("GNU SASL permanent error: %s (%s)\n",
+            gsasl_strerror_name(rc), gsasl_strerror(rc));
+        log_write(0, LOG_REJECT, "%s authenticator (%s):\n  "
+            "GNU SASL permanent failure: %s (%s)",
+            ablock->name, ob->server_mech,
+            gsasl_strerror_name(rc), gsasl_strerror(rc));
+        if (rc == GSASL_BASE64_ERROR)
+          exim_error_override = BAD64;
+        goto STOP_INTERACTION;
+
+      default:
+        auth_defer_msg = string_sprintf("GNU SASL temporary error: %s (%s)",
+            gsasl_strerror_name(rc), gsasl_strerror(rc));
+        HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("%s\n", auth_defer_msg);
+        exim_error_override = DEFER;
+        goto STOP_INTERACTION;
+    }
+
+    exim_error =
+      auth_get_no64_data((uschar **)&received, (uschar *)to_send);
+    if (exim_error)
+      break; /* handles * cancelled check */
+
+  } while (rc == GSASL_NEEDS_MORE);
+
+STOP_INTERACTION:
+  auth_result = rc;
+
+  gsasl_finish(sctx);
+
+  /* Can return: OK DEFER FAIL CANCELLED BAD64 UNEXPECTED */
+
+  if (exim_error != OK)
+    return exim_error;
+
+  if (auth_result != GSASL_OK) {
+    HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("authentication returned %s (%s)\n",
+        gsasl_strerror_name(auth_result), gsasl_strerror(auth_result));
+    if (exim_error_override != OK)
+      return exim_error_override; /* might be DEFER */
+    if (sasl_error_should_defer) /* overriding auth failure SASL error */
+      return DEFER;
+    return FAIL;
+  }
+
+  /* Auth succeeded, check server_condition unless already done in callback */
+  return checked_server_condition ? OK : auth_check_serv_cond(ablock);
+}
+
+/* returns the GSASL status of expanding the Exim string given */
+static int
+condition_check(auth_instance *ablock, uschar *label, uschar *condition_string)
+{
+  int exim_rc;
+
+  exim_rc = auth_check_some_cond(ablock, label, condition_string, FAIL);
+
+  if (exim_rc == OK) {
+    return GSASL_OK;
+  } else if (exim_rc == DEFER) {
+    sasl_error_should_defer = TRUE;
+    return GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR;
+  } else if (exim_rc == FAIL) {
+    return GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR;
+  }
+
+  log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG_FOR, "%s authenticator:  "
+            "Unhandled return from checking %s: %d",
+            ablock->name, label, exim_rc);
+  /* NOTREACHED */
+  return GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR;
+}
+
+static int
+server_callback(Gsasl *ctx, Gsasl_session *sctx, Gsasl_property prop, auth_instance *ablock)
+{
+  char *tmps;
+  uschar *propval;
+  int cbrc = GSASL_NO_CALLBACK;
+  int i;
+  auth_gsasl_options_block *ob =
+    (auth_gsasl_options_block *)(ablock->options_block);
+
+  HDEBUG(D_auth)
+    debug_printf("GNU SASL callback %d for %s/%s as server\n",
+        prop, ablock->name, ablock->public_name);
+
+  for (i = 0; i < AUTH_VARS; i++) auth_vars[i] = NULL;
+  expand_nmax = 0;
+
+  switch (prop) {
+    case GSASL_VALIDATE_SIMPLE:
+      /* GSASL_AUTHID, GSASL_AUTHZID, and GSASL_PASSWORD */
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHID);
+      auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
+      auth_vars[1] = expand_nstring[2] = propval ? propval : US"";
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_PASSWORD);
+      auth_vars[2] = expand_nstring[3] = propval ? propval : US"";
+      expand_nmax = 3;
+      for (i = 1; i <= 3; ++i)
+        expand_nlength[i] = Ustrlen(expand_nstring[i]);
+
+      cbrc = condition_check(ablock, US"server_condition", ablock->server_condition);
+      checked_server_condition = TRUE;
+      break;
+
+    case GSASL_VALIDATE_EXTERNAL:
+      if (ablock->server_condition == NULL) {
+        HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("No server_condition supplied, to validate EXTERNAL.\n");
+        cbrc = GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR;
+        break;
+      }
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
+      /* We always set $auth1, even if only to empty string. */
+      auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
+      expand_nlength[1] = Ustrlen(expand_nstring[1]);
+      expand_nmax = 1;
+
+      cbrc = condition_check(ablock,
+          US"server_condition (EXTERNAL)", ablock->server_condition);
+      checked_server_condition = TRUE;
+      break;
+
+    case GSASL_VALIDATE_ANONYMOUS:
+      if (ablock->server_condition == NULL) {
+        HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("No server_condition supplied, to validate ANONYMOUS.\n");
+        cbrc = GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR;
+        break;
+      }
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_ANONYMOUS_TOKEN);
+      /* We always set $auth1, even if only to empty string. */
+      auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
+      expand_nlength[1] = Ustrlen(expand_nstring[1]);
+      expand_nmax = 1;
+
+      cbrc = condition_check(ablock,
+          US"server_condition (ANONYMOUS)", ablock->server_condition);
+      checked_server_condition = TRUE;
+      break;
+
+    case GSASL_VALIDATE_GSSAPI:
+      /* GSASL_AUTHZID and GSASL_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_NAME */
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
+      auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_NAME);
+      auth_vars[1] = expand_nstring[2] = propval ? propval : US"";
+      expand_nmax = 2;
+      for (i = 1; i <= 2; ++i)
+        expand_nlength[i] = Ustrlen(expand_nstring[i]);
+
+      /* In this one case, it perhaps makes sense to default back open?
+      But for consistency, let's just mandate server_condition here too. */
+      cbrc = condition_check(ablock,
+          US"server_condition (GSSAPI family)", ablock->server_condition);
+      checked_server_condition = TRUE;
+      break;
+
+    case GSASL_PASSWORD:
+      /* DIGEST-MD5: GSASL_AUTHID, GSASL_AUTHZID and GSASL_REALM
+         CRAM-MD5: GSASL_AUTHID
+         PLAIN: GSASL_AUTHID and GSASL_AUTHZID
+         LOGIN: GSASL_AUTHID
+       */
+      if (ob->server_scram_iter) {
+        tmps = CS expand_string(ob->server_scram_iter);
+        gsasl_property_set(sctx, GSASL_SCRAM_ITER, tmps);
+      }
+      if (ob->server_scram_salt) {
+        tmps = CS expand_string(ob->server_scram_salt);
+        gsasl_property_set(sctx, GSASL_SCRAM_SALT, tmps);
+      }
+      /* Asking for GSASL_AUTHZID will probably call back into us.
+      Do we really want to hardcode limits per mechanism?  What happens when
+      a new mechanism is added to the library.  It *shouldn't* result in us
+      needing to add more glue, since avoiding that is a large part of the
+      point of SASL. */
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHID);
+      auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
+      auth_vars[1] = expand_nstring[2] = propval ? propval : US"";
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_REALM);
+      auth_vars[2] = expand_nstring[3] = propval ? propval : US"";
+      expand_nmax = 3;
+      for (i = 1; i <= 3; ++i)
+        expand_nlength[i] = Ustrlen(expand_nstring[i]);
+
+      tmps = CS expand_string(ob->server_password);
+      if (tmps == NULL) {
+        sasl_error_should_defer = expand_string_forcedfail ? FALSE : TRUE;
+        HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("server_password expansion failed, so "
+            "can't tell GNU SASL library the password for %s\n", auth_vars[0]);
+        return GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR;
+      }
+      gsasl_property_set(sctx, GSASL_PASSWORD, tmps);
+      /* This is inadequate; don't think Exim's store stacks are geared
+      for memory wiping, so expanding strings will leave stuff laying around.
+      But no need to compound the problem, so get rid of the one we can. */
+      memset(tmps, '\0', strlen(tmps));
+      cbrc = GSASL_OK;
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("Unrecognised callback: %d\n", prop);
+      cbrc = GSASL_NO_CALLBACK;
+  }
+
+  HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("Returning %s (%s)\n",
+      gsasl_strerror_name(cbrc), gsasl_strerror(cbrc));
+
+  return cbrc;
+}
+
+
+/*************************************************
+*              Client entry point                *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* For interface, see auths/README */
+
+int
+auth_gsasl_client(
+  auth_instance *ablock,                 /* authenticator block */
+  smtp_inblock *inblock,                 /* connection inblock */
+  smtp_outblock *outblock,               /* connection outblock */
+  int timeout,                           /* command timeout */
+  uschar *buffer,                        /* buffer for reading response */
+  int buffsize)                          /* size of buffer */
+{
+  HDEBUG(D_auth)
+    debug_printf("Client side NOT IMPLEMENTED: you should not see this!\n");
+  /* NOT IMPLEMENTED */
+  return FAIL;
+}
+
+static int
+client_callback(Gsasl *ctx, Gsasl_session *sctx, Gsasl_property prop, auth_instance *ablock)
+{
+  int cbrc = GSASL_NO_CALLBACK;
+  HDEBUG(D_auth)
+    debug_printf("GNU SASL callback %d for %s/%s as client\n",
+        prop, ablock->name, ablock->public_name);
+
+  HDEBUG(D_auth)
+    debug_printf("Client side NOT IMPLEMENTED: you should not see this!\n");
+
+  return cbrc;
+}
+
+/*************************************************
+*                Diagnostic API                  *
+*************************************************/
+
+void
+auth_gsasl_version_report(FILE *f)
+{
+  const char *runtime;
+  runtime = gsasl_check_version(NULL);
+  fprintf(f, "Library version: GNU SASL: Compile: %s\n"
+             "                           Runtime: %s\n",
+          GSASL_VERSION, runtime);
+}
+
+#endif  /* AUTH_GSASL */
+
+/* End of gsasl_exim.c */
diff --git a/src/src/auths/gsasl_exim.h b/src/src/auths/gsasl_exim.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..785b853
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/src/auths/gsasl_exim.h
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/*************************************************
+*     Exim - an Internet mail transport agent    *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2012 */
+/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
+
+/* Copyright (c) Twitter Inc 2012 */
+
+/* Interface to GNU SASL library for generic authentication. */
+
+/* Authenticator-specific options. */
+
+typedef struct {
+  uschar *server_service;
+  uschar *server_hostname;
+  uschar *server_realm;
+  uschar *server_mech;
+  uschar *server_password;
+  uschar *server_scram_iter;
+  uschar *server_scram_salt;
+  BOOL    server_channelbinding;
+} auth_gsasl_options_block;
+
+/* Data for reading the authenticator-specific options. */
+
+extern optionlist auth_gsasl_options[];
+extern int auth_gsasl_options_count;
+
+/* Defaults for the authenticator-specific options. */
+
+extern auth_gsasl_options_block auth_gsasl_option_defaults;
+
+/* The entry points for the mechanism */
+
+extern void auth_gsasl_init(auth_instance *);
+extern int auth_gsasl_server(auth_instance *, uschar *);
+extern int auth_gsasl_client(auth_instance *, smtp_inblock *,
+                                smtp_outblock *, int, uschar *, int);
+extern void auth_gsasl_version_report(FILE *f);
+
+/* End of gsasl_exim.h */
diff --git a/src/src/config.h.defaults b/src/src/config.h.defaults
index bc983c4..c562ee9 100644
--- a/src/src/config.h.defaults
+++ b/src/src/config.h.defaults
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ it's a default value. */
 #define AUTH_CRAM_MD5
 #define AUTH_CYRUS_SASL
 #define AUTH_DOVECOT
+#define AUTH_GSASL
 #define AUTH_PLAINTEXT
 #define AUTH_SPA


diff --git a/src/src/drtables.c b/src/src/drtables.c
index 37ecf4f..6e42ef9 100644
--- a/src/src/drtables.c
+++ b/src/src/drtables.c
@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ set to NULL for those that are not compiled into the binary. */
#include "auths/dovecot.h"
#endif

+#ifdef AUTH_GSASL
+#include "auths/gsasl_exim.h"
+#endif
+
 #ifdef AUTH_PLAINTEXT
 #include "auths/plaintext.h"
 #endif
@@ -58,7 +62,8 @@ auth_info auths_available[] = {
   sizeof(auth_cram_md5_options_block),
   auth_cram_md5_init,                        /* init function */
   auth_cram_md5_server,                      /* server function */
-  auth_cram_md5_client                       /* client function */
+  auth_cram_md5_client,                      /* client function */
+  NULL                                       /* diagnostic function */
   },
 #endif


@@ -71,7 +76,8 @@ auth_info auths_available[] = {
   sizeof(auth_cyrus_sasl_options_block),
   auth_cyrus_sasl_init,                      /* init function */
   auth_cyrus_sasl_server,                    /* server function */
-  NULL                                       /* client function */
+  NULL,                                      /* client function */
+  auth_cyrus_sasl_version_report             /* diagnostic function */
   },
 #endif


@@ -84,7 +90,22 @@ auth_info auths_available[] = {
   sizeof(auth_dovecot_options_block),
   auth_dovecot_init,                          /* init function */
   auth_dovecot_server,                        /* server function */
-  NULL                                        /* client function */
+  NULL,                                       /* client function */
+  NULL                                        /* diagnostic function */
+  },
+#endif
+
+#ifdef AUTH_GSASL
+  {
+  US"gsasl",                                  /* lookup name */
+  auth_gsasl_options,
+  &auth_gsasl_options_count,
+  &auth_gsasl_option_defaults,
+  sizeof(auth_gsasl_options_block),
+  auth_gsasl_init,                            /* init function */
+  auth_gsasl_server,                          /* server function */
+  NULL,                                       /* client function */
+  auth_gsasl_version_report                   /* diagnostic function */
   },
 #endif


@@ -97,7 +118,8 @@ auth_info auths_available[] = {
   sizeof(auth_plaintext_options_block),
   auth_plaintext_init,                       /* init function */
   auth_plaintext_server,                     /* server function */
-  auth_plaintext_client                      /* client function */
+  auth_plaintext_client,                     /* client function */
+  NULL                                       /* diagnostic function */
   },
 #endif


@@ -110,11 +132,12 @@ auth_info auths_available[] = {
   sizeof(auth_spa_options_block),
   auth_spa_init,                             /* init function */
   auth_spa_server,                           /* server function */
-  auth_spa_client                            /* client function */
+  auth_spa_client,                           /* client function */
+  NULL                                       /* diagnostic function */
   },
 #endif


-{ US"", NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL }
+{ US"", NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
};


diff --git a/src/src/exim.c b/src/src/exim.c
index a6c0d78..b4ea01d 100644
--- a/src/src/exim.c
+++ b/src/src/exim.c
@@ -725,6 +725,8 @@ Returns:    nothing
 static void
 show_whats_supported(FILE *f)
 {
+  auth_info *authi;
+
 #ifdef DB_VERSION_STRING
 fprintf(f, "Berkeley DB: %s\n", DB_VERSION_STRING);
 #elif defined(BTREEVERSION) && defined(HASHVERSION)
@@ -867,6 +869,9 @@ fprintf(f, "Authenticators:");
 #ifdef AUTH_DOVECOT
   fprintf(f, " dovecot");
 #endif
+#ifdef AUTH_GSASL
+  fprintf(f, " gsasl");
+#endif
 #ifdef AUTH_PLAINTEXT
   fprintf(f, " plaintext");
 #endif
@@ -962,9 +967,11 @@ DEBUG(D_any) do {
   tls_version_report(f);
 #endif


-#ifdef AUTH_CYRUS_SASL
-  auth_cyrus_sasl_version_report(f);
-#endif
+  for (authi = auths_available; *authi->driver_name != '\0'; ++authi) {
+    if (authi->version_report) {
+      (*authi->version_report)(f);
+    }
+  }


   fprintf(f, "Library version: PCRE: Compile: %d.%d%s\n"
              "                       Runtime: %s\n",
diff --git a/src/src/exim.h b/src/src/exim.h
index a45ea0b..626d33d 100644
--- a/src/src/exim.h
+++ b/src/src/exim.h
@@ -538,12 +538,4 @@ default to EDQUOT if it exists, otherwise ENOSPC. */
   #endif
 #endif


-/* These are for reporting version information from various componenents, to
-figure out what's actually happening. They need to be available to the main
-function, so we declare them here. Unfortunate. */
-
-#ifdef AUTH_CYRUS_SASL
-extern void auth_cyrus_sasl_version_report(FILE *);
-#endif
-
 /* End of exim.h */
diff --git a/src/src/functions.h b/src/src/functions.h
index 5efcbbb..d257594 100644
--- a/src/src/functions.h
+++ b/src/src/functions.h
@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ extern int     auth_call_radius(uschar *, uschar **);
 extern int     auth_call_saslauthd(uschar *, uschar *, uschar *, uschar *,
                  uschar **);
 extern int     auth_check_serv_cond(auth_instance *);
+extern int     auth_check_some_cond(auth_instance *, uschar *, uschar *, int);
+
 extern int     auth_get_data(uschar **, uschar *, int);
 extern int     auth_get_no64_data(uschar **, uschar *);
 extern uschar *auth_xtextencode(uschar *, int);
diff --git a/src/src/globals.h b/src/src/globals.h
index 4ed3950..1066306 100644
--- a/src/src/globals.h
+++ b/src/src/globals.h
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ extern uschar *openssl_options;        /* OpenSSL compatibility options */
 extern const pcre *regex_STARTTLS;     /* For recognizing STARTTLS settings */
 extern uschar *tls_advertise_hosts;    /* host for which TLS is advertised */
 extern uschar *tls_certificate;        /* Certificate file */
+extern uschar *tls_channelbinding_b64; /* string of base64 channel binding */
 extern uschar *tls_crl;                /* CRL File */
 extern uschar *tls_dhparam;            /* DH param file */
 extern BOOL    tls_offered;            /* Server offered TLS */
@@ -101,6 +102,10 @@ extern uschar *tls_verify_certificates;/* Path for certificates to check */
 extern uschar *tls_verify_hosts;       /* Mandatory client verification */
 #endif


+#ifdef USE_GNUTLS
+extern
+#endif
+

 /* Input-reading functions for messages, so we can use special ones for
 incoming TCP/IP. */
diff --git a/src/src/structs.h b/src/src/structs.h
index 3790c7f..9b51d0b 100644
--- a/src/src/structs.h
+++ b/src/src/structs.h
@@ -367,6 +367,8 @@ typedef struct auth_info {
     int,                          /* command timeout */
     uschar *,                     /* buffer for reading response */
     int);                         /* sizeof buffer */
+  void (*version_report)(         /* diagnostic version reporting */
+    FILE *);                      /* I/O stream to print to */
 } auth_info;



diff --git a/src/src/tls-gnu.c b/src/src/tls-gnu.c
index f77768f..2d1a327 100644
--- a/src/src/tls-gnu.c
+++ b/src/src/tls-gnu.c
@@ -854,7 +854,10 @@ construct_cipher_name(gnutls_session session)
{
static uschar cipherbuf[256];
uschar *ver;
-int bits, c, kx, mac;
+int bits, c, kx, mac, rc;
+#ifdef GNUTLS_CB_TLS_UNIQUE
+gnutls_datum_t channel;
+#endif

ver = string_copy(
US gnutls_protocol_get_name(gnutls_protocol_get_version(session)));
@@ -871,6 +874,21 @@ string_format(cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), "%s:%s:%u", ver,
tls_cipher = cipherbuf;

DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("cipher: %s\n", cipherbuf);
+
+if (tls_channelbinding_b64)
+ free(tls_channelbinding_b64);
+tls_channelbinding_b64 = NULL;
+
+#ifdef GNUTLS_CB_TLS_UNIQUE
+channel = { NULL, 0 };
+rc = gnutls_session_channel_binding(session, GNUTLS_CB_TLS_UNIQUE, &channel);
+if (rc) {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Channel binding error: %s\n", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+} else {
+ tls_channelbinding_b64 = auth_b64encode(channel.data, (int)channel.size);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Have channel bindings cached for possible auth usage.\n");
+}
+#endif
}


diff --git a/src/src/tls.c b/src/src/tls.c
index 7cb1550..d975a2c 100644
--- a/src/src/tls.c
+++ b/src/src/tls.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ static int ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = 0;
static int ssl_xfer_eof = 0;
static int ssl_xfer_error = 0;

+uschar *tls_channelbinding_b64 = NULL;


/*************************************************