Re: [Exim] Exim + RAV

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Auteur: rogertomlinson
Date:  
À: Tamas TEVESZ, rogertomlinson, exim-users
Sujet: Re: [Exim] Exim + RAV
Tamas, your right for many instances SMTP listener may not be the prefered choice.
If you want to look at the code heck, use Amavis, Blackhole, sophie, or something
else. You can beat on vexira all you like BTW :-) I have no love for them, just
like vexira because it is working very good for us here and is not causing me
any late night telnet from home sessions.

You are also right that holes exist in all software. I don't think we will ever
find "secure" software but instead software and technologies that currently
are "more secure" than other currently existing products. A good example is
encryption. What once was secure well today, isn't. I think that all software
is in this flux. Today it is secure until tomorrow it is cracked.

I also don't think that all software should be open source. Sure I like and
use open source software but I know first hand that it is not practical or possible
to be in business and open source for all companies.

Roger

>On Mon, 26 Aug 2002 rogertomlinson@??? wrote:
>
> > A much simpler and easier solution is to avoid RAV and use Vexira MailArmor


> > instead. With Vexira MailArmor you setup **any** Linux server as a proxy

server
> > and virus scan and forward mail to the backend Exim server. You can read

more
>
>frankly, not intending to step op anyone's toes, but... why exactly
>would anyone want to run some binary-only *crap* (not directly
>referring to vexira, but referring to every proprietary product which
>these companies who are riding this linux wave, and speaking from
>experience) as a *listener* for a quite important service, instead
>running something you (hopefully) trust and can examine, if you have
>any doubt ?
>
>i've checked quite a number of virus scanning in the last couple of
>months. the above rule-of-thumb is #1 on my list to examine; "does it
>want to be a listener ? phew, one less to struggle with."
>
>what exactly are you going to do when someone discovers a hole wide
>enough to push the eiffel tower through in vexira's (insert xxx here)
>smtp listener ?
>
>my view is that any virus scanner which is even a tad bit more than a
>library you can interface with (see sophie, trophie and the kinds), if
>it wants to be anything more than just a scanning engine, is to be
>avoided like plague. if one is lucky enough to use something that can
>be interfaces with with some glues like sophie/trophie, wisest choice
>is to use those. with eyes wide open...
>
>(the above is coming from a very frustrating experience trying to
>breach a product i'm using, being unsuccesful [so far], but this
>unsuccesfulness isn't the above said product's programmer's advantage,
>but a limitation in currently used filesystems. the holes are there,
>though. [no, it's not vexira. vexira fell off at question number
>one]).
>
>--
>[-]
>
>


-----------------------------------
Roger Tomlinson - NOC Administrator
Victoria, Australia


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