On Fri, Dec 28, 2001, Richard Welty wrote:
> the concern, i think, is that the naive will confuse SMTP over TLS with
> real security, which it is not. SMTP over TLS cannot be real security
What is "real security"?
> under any scenario, because it is not end-to-end from the viewpoint of
> sender to receiver. it is only end to end from one MTA to the next MTA.
> in my view, the authentication issue is a red herring when talking about
> MTA-to-MTA transport via SMTP over TLS, because the authentication battle
> has already been lost by the time the email reaches the first MTA. > real security in email is accomplished with PGP, GPG, S/MIME, or other
> similar approaches, none of which really have anything to do with exim
> other than the fact that exim is a good way to transport them.
I can easily achieve "real security" by just using STARTTLS.
Example: two boxes controlled by two persons (they are the only
ones who have root on their machines). The MTA checks the certs
and the mail goes only encrypted (and authenticated) over the wire.
That's "enough" security (there is no "real security").
It's just a question of your threat model.
