On Sat, 8 Sep 2001, Alan J. Flavell wrote:
> So there's certainly some force in your argument, but I wouldn't call
> the feature entirely worthless; but I'm surprised that the crypted
> identd isn't more widely deployed instead of the plain-text one.
There's little point in using the encrypted version when you don't make
any secret of your login ids. (Though I suppose there is the "digital
signature" point.)
We run ident on our shared systems, some of which have thousands of
users. If one of our users abuses a remote machine, we aren't all that
interested in trying to track down the culprit unless the remote has
make the ident call and recorded what our system sent back.
--
Philip Hazel University of Cambridge Computing Service,
ph10@??? Cambridge, England. Phone: +44 1223 334714.
