Philip Hazel writes:
>
> This facility still does not stop some evil person out there in the
> world telnetting to your SMTP daemon and typing:
>
> MAIL FROM: Neal.Becker@???
> RCPT TO: <any address in the world>
>
Why can't this be stopped, though? If <any address in the world> is not
a local address, or part of a list of domains we want to accept and
forward mail to, I don't see it as that difficult a test, and I can't
see any major problem it would cause. Local outgoing mail typically
wouldn't be a problem, as either it originates from the local machine
through a different mechanism, or, it originates from domains we can
also validate and list as permitted to do this (i.e. pop clients
connecting to the machine from known addresses or domains or other mail
machines within our domain)
As we already have a (relatively) valid identification of connecting
machines, it seems that some fairly basic rules could be put in place to
stop this.
One question. When a mailer from offsite has a piece of mail to deliver
to a user on your site, and that user is one of several hundred entries
on the To: line, does the offsite mailer deliver it to your mailer and
expect your mailer to deliver it to the other entries on the To: line,
or does it just enter a RCPT TO: your_local_user?
--
Artificial Intelligence stands no chance against Natural Stupidity.
GAT d- -p+(--) c++++ l++ u++ t- m--- W--- !v
b+++ e* s-/+ n-(?) h++ f+g+ w+++ y*
